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Abstract
Some patients with disorders of consciousness retain sensory and cognitive abilities that
are not apparent from their outward behaviour. It is crucial to identify and characterise
these covert abilities for diagnosis, prognosis, and medical ethics. This thesis uses
neuroimaging techniques to investigate cognitive preservation and awareness in patients
who are behaviourally non-responsive due to acquired brain injuries. In the first chapter,
a large sample of healthy volunteers, including experienced athletes and musicians,
imagined actions of varying complexity and familiarity. Motor imagery involving certain
complex, familiar actions correlated with a more robust sensorimotor rhythm. In the
second chapter, several patients with disorders of consciousness participated in multiple
experiments based on neural responses to mental imagery, including one task featuring
complex, familiar imagined actions. Although the patients did not generate enhanced
sensorimotor rhythms for the complex, familiar motor imagery, the detection of covert
cognition was more sensitive owing to the multi-modal nature of the assessment. In the
final empirical chapter, a sample of healthy volunteers and a heterogeneous cohort of
patients with disorders of consciousness completed a novel oddball task based on tactile
stimulation. Critically, this task delineated an attentional hierarchy in the patient sample,
and patients with the ability to follow commands were differentiated from those unable to
do so by event-related potential evidence of attentional orienting. Due to the
heterogeneity of aetiology and pathology in the disorders of consciousness, these patients
vary in their suitability for neuroimaging, the preservation of neural structures, and the
cognitive resources available to them. Assessments of several perceptual and cognitive
abilities supported by spatially-distinct brain regions and indexed by multiple neural
signatures are therefore required to accurately characterise a patient’s abilities and
probable subjective experience.

Keywords
Mental imagery, attention, sensorimotor rhythm, event-related potential, awareness,
disorders of consciousness.
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Chapter 1

1

General Introduction

1.1 Disorders of consciousness
Following a severe head injury, a person may enter a non-responsive state referred to as
coma. Patients in a comatose state often require life-sustaining therapies and do not
respond to external stimulation (Plum & Posner, 1972). Upon emergence from coma,
some patients resume alternating periods of eye-opening and quiescence that resemble
healthy sleep-wake cycles, alongside absent or inconsistent behavioural responsiveness
(Bernat, 2006; Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013; Giacino, Fins, Laureys, & Schiff,
2014). Patients who do not exhibit voluntary responses to external stimulation are
diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State (Bernat, 2006; Jennett, 2002). Diagnostic
criteria for the Vegetative State were initially described in 1972 (Jennett & Plum, 1972).
Several international task forces have revisited these criteria since then (e.g., Andrews,
1996; Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994a; Royal College of Physicians Working
Group, 1996, 2003). Across all iterations, however, there is consensus that patients in a
Vegetative State lack awareness. To more accurately and sensitively describe the
Vegetative State, it was recently proposed that this disorder be renamed Unresponsive
Wakefulness Syndrome (Laureys et al., 2010). In 2002, formal diagnostic criteria for the
Minimally Conscious State were proposed to describe patients who generate variable, but
reproducible, voluntary responses to external stimulation (Giacino et al., 2002). Patients
in a Minimally Conscious State possess awareness, and the ability to follow verbal
commands may be indicated by a diagnostic qualifier of ‘Plus’ if present (Minimally
Conscious State Plus), or ‘Minus’ if absent (Minimally Conscious State Minus; Bruno et
al., 2012; Bruno, Vanhaudenhuyse, Thibaut, Moonen, & Laureys, 2011). Emergence
from a Minimally Conscious State is indicated when a patient demonstrates functional,
accurate communication or functional object use (Giacino et al., 2002). Together with
coma and brain death, these altered states of awareness following brain injury comprise
the disorders of consciousness (Table 1).

2

Table 1. Overview of the disorders of consciousness.
Characteristic
Behaviour

Command Following
and Communication

Diagnosis

Description

Brain death

Loss of all brainstem reflexes None
and absence of breathing
(continuing apnoea)

None

Coma

Closed eyes without
responsiveness to stimulation
for no more than about four
weeks

None, although some
patients may exhibit
reflexive responses to
pain

None

Vegetative State/
Unresponsive
Wakefulness
Syndrome

Periods of eye-opening
without reproducible,
voluntary responses to
stimulation

None, or reflexive
behaviour, including any
of:

None

Non-behavioural
Minimally Conscious
State

Sometimes denoted as a nonbehavioural Minimally
Conscious State when
command following is
demonstrated in a
neuroimaging-based
assessment

Startle responses
(auditory or visual);
abnormal posturing;
withdrawal (motor);

Patients in a nonbehavioural Minimally
Conscious State
demonstrate command
following in a
neuroimaging-based
assessment

reflexive oral movements;
and/or
localization to sound

Minimally Conscious
State (Plus or Minus)

Emergence from a
Minimally Conscious
State

Periods of eye-opening with
reflexive and voluntary
behaviour

Reproducible reflexive
and voluntary behaviour,
including at least one of:

Sometimes denoted as
Minimally Conscious State
Plus when behavioural
command following is
present, or Minimally
Conscious State Minus when
behavioural command
following is absent

Visual fixation or pursuit; Minimally Conscious State
Plus patients demonstrate
object localization,
at least one of:
recognition, or
Reproducible or consistent
manipulation;
movement to command;
orientation to noxious
stimulation; or
intelligible verbalization;
or
automatic motor
responses
non-functional, intentional
communication

Periods of eye-opening with
reflexive and sophisticated
voluntary behaviour

Reproducible reflexive
and voluntary behaviour,
including at least one of:
Accurate functional
communication; and/or

Minimally Conscious State
Minus patients demonstrate
none

At least one of:
Accurate, functional
communication; or
functional object use

functional object use

Notes. All behavioural criteria are taken from the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (Kalmar
& Giacino, 2005).
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Disorders of consciousness are often caused by traumatic brain injuries (Bernat, 2006;
Pisa, Biasutti, Drigo, & Barbone, 2014). A patient may also enter these states following a
non-traumatic brain injury, which commonly occurs from hypoxia secondary to cardiac
arrest or stroke (Bernat, 2006; Tresch, Sims, Duthie, Goldstein, & Lane, 1991).
Additionally, an adult patient with a neurodegenerative disease, such as Parkinson’s or
Huntington’s, may progress to a Minimally Conscious State in the final stages of his or
her illness (Walshe & Leonard, 1985). Regarding pathology, traumatic cases of disorders
of consciousness usually include diffuse axonal injury in white matter alongside other
neuronal damage from injuries such as cortical contusions, increased intracranial
pressure, and cerebral haemorrhages (Adams, Graham, & Jennett, 2000). In nontraumatic cases of disorders of consciousness involving hypoxia, extensive damage to
cortical and thalamic grey matter is common (Dougherty, Rawlinson, Levy, & Plum,
1981). Total grey matter volume, however, does not necessarily differentiate between the
Vegetative State and Minimally Conscious State (Di Perri et al., 2016). The Vegetative
State and Minimally Conscious State differ such that the Vegetative State usually
corresponds with more severe pathological changes than the Minimally Conscious State
(Bernat, 2006; Jennett, Adams, Murray, & Graham, 2001). Brainstem and hypothalamic
structures are typically preserved in all patients with disorders of consciousness (Kinney
& Samuels, 1994). In this thesis, all patient cohorts comprise convenience samples of
adults with acquired brain injuries of traumatic, non-traumatic, or mixed (i.e., both
traumatic and non-traumatic) aetiology. Although details are provided concerning the
aetiology and pathology of each patient’s brain injuries, a group-level examination of
these factors is not included because the convenience samples are small and highly
heterogeneous.
Disorders of consciousness are usually denoted with an acute or chronic time course.
Some patients temporarily exhibit a Vegetative State or Minimally Conscious State as
they recover from a head injury, while other patients remain in these states until the end
of their lives. Assuming the same diagnosis, a patient with a non-traumatic brain injury is
less likely to regain awareness than a patient with a traumatic brain injury (Multi-Society
Task Force on PVS, 1994a, 1994b). Additionally, a patient’s likelihood of recovering

4

awareness decreases the longer the patient persists in the same conscious state. For
example, the probability that an adult patient in a Vegetative State recovers awareness is
less than 1% after 3 months following a non-traumatic brain injury and after 1 year
following a traumatic brain injury (Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994a, 1994b). For
patients in a Minimally Conscious State for less than 1 month post-injury, up to 50% will
return to an independent life after 1 year (Giacino, 2004). For patients who persist in a
Minimally Conscious State for 1 month or longer, however, outcomes considerably vary
after 2 to 5 years; some patients exhibit mild disabilities with total functional
independence, while other patients remain severely disabled and completely dependent
on others (Lammi, Smith, Tate, & Taylor, 2005). Notably, there are several reports of
seemingly spontaneous recoveries of awareness beyond these timelines for patients with
disorders of consciousness (e.g., Arts, van Dongen, van Hof-van Duin, & Lammens,
1985; Rosenberg, Johnson, & Brenner, 1977; Wilson, Gracey, & Bainbridge, 2001).
Additionally, there a few reports of patients who exhibited at least a partial recovery of
awareness after treatment with targeted therapy, including deep brain stimulation and
various drugs (e.g., Clauss & Nel, 2006; Georgiopoulos et al., 2010; Sarà et al., 2007;
Tsubokawa et al., 1990). Nevertheless, there is currently no evidence-based, curative
treatment available for disorders of consciousness, and patients with chronic disorders of
consciousness are very unlikely to recover functional independence.
It is difficult to estimate the life expectancy for patients with disorders of consciousness.
This difficulty arises in part due to the self-fulfilling prophecy that patients with poor or
uncertain prognosis may be provided with less life-sustaining therapy in the acute phase
of treatment and less active medical management in the chronic phase (Becker et al.,
2001; Bernat, 2006; Weimer, Nowacki, & Frontera, 2016). In terms of acute treatment,
there currently are prognostic indicators of only poor recovery available for patients in a
coma or acute Vegetative State (Bates, 2001; Teasdale et al., 2014; Zandbergen, de Haan,
Stoutenbeek, Koelman, & Hijdra, 1998). Likewise, there are no reliable prognostic
indicators for patients in an acute Minimally Conscious State (Giacino & Kalmar, 2007;
Lammi et al., 2005). For patients who lack indicators of poor recovery in this critical
acute treatment phase, possible outcomes include death, chronic disorders of
consciousness, various levels of disability, and full functional recovery (Teasdale et al.,
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2014; Zandbergen et al., 1998). Understandably, this uncertainty complicates the decision
to continue or withdraw life-sustaining therapies. During the chronic treatment phase,
medical comorbidities are common and often arise shortly after the patient is transferred
to a rehabilitation unit for continuing care (Whyte et al., 2013). Examples of common
medical complications include urinary tract infections and pneumonia, and patients with
chronic disorders of consciousness may die from undetected or insufficiently managed
infections. Nevertheless, medical complications become less frequent with time, and
active management typically reduces reoccurrence and severity (Whyte et al., 2013). In
fact, patients who sustain injuries early in adulthood with appropriate management of
comorbidities can survive for years with artificial nutrition and hydration (Bernat, 2006).
All patients described in this thesis exhibited chronic disorders of consciousness, and
several of the patients presented with the same conscious state for a decade and longer.
Prevalence data concerning disorders of consciousness are difficult to obtain due to
variability in international diagnostic criteria and few large-scale, multi-centred
investigations. A recent epidemiological review of primarily European centres obtained
prevalence estimates of 0.2 to 3.4 cases per 100,000 inhabitants for patients in a
Vegetative State and 1.5 per 100,000 inhabitants for patients in a Minimally Conscious
State (Pisa et al., 2014). Traumatic aetiology accounted for 21.9% to 53.8% of all cases
(Pisa et al., 2014). An older report estimated the prevalence of the Vegetative State in the
United States of America and Europe at 1.4 to 6.7 per 100,000 inhabitants from 1 month
post-injury, and this estimate decreased to 0.5 to 2.5 per 100,000 from 6 months postinjury (Jennett, 2002). Unfortunately, there were no epidemiological studies of disorders
of consciousness in Canada available at the time of writing. Nevertheless, brain injury is
common in Canada; for example, about 15,300 Canadians were hospitalized due to
traumatic brain injuries in 2003, accounting for about 8% of all admissions for trauma
that year (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2006). Additionally, the average
direct medical cost of the first year post-injury in the same period was $31,000 per patient
for those with traumatic injuries and $38,000 per patient for those with non-traumatic
injuries (Chen et al., 2012). Although true disorders of consciousness are relatively
uncommon, these disorders present challenging medical and scientific questions that are
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subject to investigation from many special interest groups around the world (Gosseries,
Zasler, & Laureys, 2014).
Standards of care for patients with chronic disorders of consciousness are similar
worldwide. Recommended care includes: nutrition via gastrointestinal tube feeding;
range of motion exercises to counteract muscular contractures (spasticity); and
tracheostomy with suctioning and other pulmonary hygiene interventions for airway
protection (Sandel, 1996). This complex continuing care can be provided in a patient’s
home or in an assisted living facility. In Canada and many other nations, substitute
decision makers provide consent pertaining to medical care and other aspects of living for
patients who lack the capacity to do so themselves (Rocker & Dunbar, 2000). The
substitute decision maker is meant to: (1) express the choices the patient would make if
he or she were able to do so; and (2) act in the patient’s best interest if the patient’s likely
decision is unknown (Rocker & Dunbar, 2000). Substitute decision makers provided
informed, written consent for all patients who participated in the research reported in this
thesis in line with the guiding principles of the local Canadian ethics committees.
Given that a full functional recovery is uncommon and unlikely for many patients with
chronic disorders of consciousness, substitute decision makers and others involved in the
patient’s medical care may consider assisted dying or the withdrawal of life-sustaining
measures for the patient (Andrews, 2004; Cranford, 1984; Laureys, 2005a). Opinions on
assisted dying and the legalities concerning the different forms of this practice vary (e.g.,
Schüklenk et al., 2011; Smedira et al., 1990; Solomon et al., 1993). To further
complicate matters, the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments for most patients with
chronic disorders of consciousness necessitates the cessation of nutrition and hydration
because these patients can usually breathe without assistance. Although not uncommon in
some areas of medicine and in natural death by component patients, this practice is
understandably controversial (Ganzini et al., 2003; Meilaender, 1984; Tsai, 2011). There
have been a few cases involving patients with disorders of consciousness in the United
States of America and Canada where referrals have been made to court to address
disagreements about medical decision-making (e.g., Downar, Sibbald, Bailey, &
Kavanagh, 2014; Quill, 2005; Rich, 2013). Although there are several moral, legal, and
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ethical problems surrounding the withdrawal of life sustaining therapies for patients with
disorders of consciousness in particular (see [Jennett, 2002] for a detailed discussion), the
paramount consideration is that the wishes of the patient are respected (Gillon, 1998). If
the patient’s wishes are unclear, medical societies and governing bodies worldwide
recommend continued treatment even when recovery is unlikely (American Academy of
Neurology, 1989; British Medical Association, 2001; Rocker & Dunbar, 2000).

1.2 Differential diagnosis and restoration of communication
To differentially diagnose disorders of consciousness—i.e., to determine whether a
patient is in a Vegetative State or a Minimally Conscious State, a clinician must carefully
assess the patient’s responsiveness to stimulation to infer whether the patient is
conscious. Repeated assessments are necessary to distinguish between random or
reflexive responses and reliable, voluntary responses. Given the difficulty of this clinical
determination, several specialized instruments have been developed to facilitate the
differential diagnosis of the Vegetative State and Minimally Conscious State in particular
(Shiel, Gelling, Wilson, Coleman, & Pickard, 2004). The preferred neuropsychological
instrument for this purpose is the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (Kalmar & Giacino,
2005). This instrument has been validated in patients with disorders of consciousness
(Giacino, Kalmar, & Whyte, 2004) and found to most sensitively distinguish between the
Vegetative State and Minimally Conscious State as compared to alternative instruments
(Seel et al., 2010). The Coma Recovery Scale is also preferred to other behavioural
assessments for disorders of consciousness because it requires less training and can be
more readily adopted by clinicians who cannot access specialized neurorehabilitation
units (Bernat, 2006; cf. Gill-Thwaites & Munday, 1999; Pape, Heinemann, Kelly, Hurder,
& Lundgren, 2005). If different diagnoses are obtained across time, it is conventional to
report a patient’s diagnosis according to that patient’s most sophisticated performance. In
this thesis, each patient’s conscious state was determined using his or her best
performance on the Coma Recovery Scale. Differential diagnoses across time are
discussed when present, and all assessments were validated to ensure that no impossible
or improbable combinations of Coma Recovery Scale scores were obtained (Chatelle et
al., 2016).
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Administration of the Coma Recovery Scale entails a neuropsychological assessment
across several sensory domains categorised into six subscales (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005).
As shown in Table 2, each test item probes the patient’s ability to exhibit behavioural
responses following direct stimulation or verbal command. Within each subscale,
involuntary and reflexive behavioural responses are evaluated first; these responses only
require one or two trials to assess. If these involuntary responses are intact, increasingly
complex, voluntary behavioural responses are then probed. The patient must demonstrate
each voluntary response three or four times in an assessment for that response to be
scored as reliable and intact. Assessment of each subscale ends when the patient does not
reliably demonstrate a probed response, or when the patient reliably demonstrates all
behavioural responses for that subscale (and thus obtains the highest possible score). For
example, the first test item on the oromotor/verbal function subscale is oral reflexive
movement. An intact response constitutes immediate movements of the tongue or jaw,
such as clamping or chewing, after a tongue blade is introduced into the patient’s mouth.
Only one trial is needed to probe this response; an intact response corresponds with a
score of 1, while a lack of response corresponds with a score of 0. Additionally, the
highest possible score (3) on the oromotor/verbal function subscale is intelligible
verbalization. This behavioural response would only be probed if the patient first reliably
demonstrated oral reflexive movement (a score of 1) and vocalization/oral movement (a
score of 2). To reliably demonstrate intelligible verbalization, the patient must generate
consonant-vowel-consonant sounds for at least two different words in response to
prompts such as “What is your name?” and “How many fingers am I holding up right
now?”. Notably, reliable intelligible verbalization is a voluntary response indicative of a
Minimally Conscious State (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005).
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Table 2. Summary of the JFK Coma-Recovery Scale-Revised subscales.
This information has been published elsewhere (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005) and is
reproduced here with permission from Taylor & Francis. Taylor & Francis is pleased to
offer reuses of its content for a thesis or dissertation free of charge contingent on
resubmission of permission request if work is published.
Auditory Function
4 – Consistent Movement to Command*
3 – Reproducible Movement to Command*
2 – Localization to Sound
1 – Auditory Startle
0 – None

Oromotor/Verbal Function
3 – Intelligible Verbalization*
2 – Vocalization/Oral Movement
1 – Oral Reflexive Movement
0 – None

Visual Function
5 – Object Recognition*
4 – Object Localization: Reaching*
3 – Visual Pursuit*
2 – Fixation*, a
1 – Visual Startle
0 – None

Communication
2 – Functional: Accurate†
1 – Non-Functional: Intentional*
0 – None

Motor Function
6 – Functional Object Use†
5 – Automatic Motor Response*
4 – Object Manipulation*
3 – Localization to Noxious Stimulation*
2 – Flexion Withdrawal
1 – Abnormal Posturing
0 – None/Flaccid

Arousal
3 – Attention
2 – Eye Opening without Stimulation
1 – Eye Opening with Stimulation
0 – Unarousable

Notes. *Denotes Minimally Conscious State; †Denotes emergence from a Minimally
Conscious State.
a

Sustained visual fixation does not necessarily reflect higher order cortical brain function

in patients with disorders of consciousness and non-traumatic aetiology (Bruno et al.,
2010).
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A critical diagnostic marker in disorders of consciousness is whether a patient can follow
commands. Patients who follow commands in a bedside behavioural examination are
attributed with at least minimal consciousness, while patients who do not are regarded as
‘unaware’, i.e., diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State (Andrews, 1996; Jennett &
Plum, 1972; Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994a; Royal College of Physicians
Working Group, 1996, 2003). Unfortunately, a patient’s ability to outwardly respond may
be compromised for many reasons, such as cognitive impairments due to brain injury or
damage to the peripheral motor system (Giacino et al., 2014; Whyte et al., 2013).
Accordingly, a patient could retain awareness and be inaccurately diagnosed as being in a
Vegetative State because he or she does not overtly respond during a behavioural
assessment (Gosseries, Di, Laureys, & Boly, 2014; Owen, 2013). The rate of
misdiagnosis of a patient’s conscious state is high; as many as 43% of patients diagnosed
as being in a Vegetative State have been found to exhibit signs of awareness after careful
follow-up testing in a neurorehabilitation unit (Andrews, Murphy, Munday, &
Littlewood, 1996; Candelieri, Cortese, Dolce, Riganello, & Sannita, 2011; Childs,
Mercer, & Childs, 1993; Schnakers et al., 2009). Moreover, the consequences of such
misdiagnoses are severe. For example, false negatives—i.e., inferring that a patient does
not possess awareness when he or she does—could lead to the premature withdrawal of
life sustaining therapies and inadequate medical management of the patient (Jox, Bernat,
Laureys, & Racine, 2012; Peterson, Cruse, Naci, Weijer, & Owen, 2015). Similarly, false
positives—i.e., inferring that a patient possesses awareness when he or she does not—
could lead to a missed opportunity to withdraw life sustaining therapies and needless
financial and emotional suffering for the patient’s family (Jox et al., 2012; Peterson et al.,
2015). Due in large part to these legal, ethical, and moral challenges, the detection of
awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness has been the subject of increasing
research for about twenty years (Gosseries, Zasler, et al., 2014; Jennett, 2002; Peterson et
al., 2013; Racine & Illes, 2007).
To address the challenge of accurate diagnosis in disorders of consciousness, researchers
and clinicians have used neurophysiological markers of sensory and cognitive function to
complement behavioural assessments. Several neural markers have been identified that
can facilitate the differential diagnoses of disorders of consciousness. For instance,
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patients in a Vegetative State tend to have more metabolic dysfunction in frontoparietal
networks than patients in a Minimally Conscious State (Cavinato et al., 2015; Demertzi,
Soddu, & Laureys, 2013; Thibaut et al., 2012). At rest or during passive stimulation,
patients in a Minimally Conscious State have increased cerebral metabolism and
functional connectivity as compared to patients in a Vegetative State (Kotchoubey et al.,
2013; Laureys, Faymonville, Degueldre, et al., 2000; Laureys, Owen, & Schiff, 2004).
Moreover, the structural integrity of thalamocortical pathways is higher in patients who
demonstrate more behavioural signs of awareness (Fernández-Espejo et al., 2012;
Laureys, Faymonville, Luxen, et al., 2000; Schiff, 2008). While these passive approaches
have revealed valuable information about brain function and metabolism in patients with
disorders of consciousness, researchers have also used neuroimaging techniques to
determine whether a patient who is outwardly non-responsive can volitionally modulate
his or her brain activity—and in so doing, provide evidence of his or her ability to follow
commands.
Neuroimaging techniques have been applied to determine whether patients with disorders
of consciousness can modulate their brain activity in response to commands. Of these
techniques, one of the most widely adopted involves asking a patient to engage in mental
imagery during either a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan (Bardin et
al., 2011; Boly et al., 2007; Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013; Gibson, FernándezEspejo, et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2010; Owen et al., 2006; Stender et al., 2014) or a
recording session with electroencephalography (EEG; Coyle, Stow, McCreadie,
McElligott, & Carroll, 2015; Cruse et al., 2011; Gibson, Fernández-Espejo, et al., 2014;
Goldfine, Victor, Conte, Bardin, & Schiff, 2011; Horki et al., 2014). In this approach, the
patient’s engagement in the mental task is quantified by his or her ability to generate
reliable, temporally and/or spatially specific modulations of brain activity identified in
validation studies (Adapa, Davis, Stamatakis, Absalom, & Menon, 2014; Boly et al.,
2007; Davis et al., 2007; Fernández-Espejo, Norton, & Owen, 2014; Naci, Cusack, Jia, &
Owen, 2013; Owen & Coleman, 2007). A recent meta-analysis of studies comprising
about 1,000 patients with disorders of consciousness indicated that approximately 15% of
patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State exhibited so-called ‘covert’ command
following in a neuroimaging-based assessment (Kondziella, Friberg, Frokjaer, Fabricius,

12

& Møller, 2016). Furthermore, these neuroimaging-based approaches have warranted the
proposal of the non-behavioural Minimally Conscious State, which is indicated when a
patient demonstrates covert command following alongside outward behaviour consistent
with a Vegetative State (Gosseries, Zasler, et al., 2014).
From a rehabilitation perspective, the ability to regulate one’s brain activity in response
to command could be fostered to eventually allow a suitable patient to communicate.
Indeed, a few cases of fMRI-based communication by patients with disorders of
consciousness have been reported using fMRI (Bardin, Schiff, & Voss, 2012; FernándezEspejo & Owen, 2013; Forgacs et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2010; Naci & Owen, 2013).
These findings raise the possibility that some patients diagnosed with disorders of
consciousness could benefit from assistive devices known as brain-computer interfaces
(Chatelle et al., 2012; Gibson, Owen, & Cruse, 2016; Naci et al., 2012). In brief, a braincomputer interface allows a person to operate a computer without producing a motor
response. Subject-specific patterns of brain activity can be identified using machinelearning techniques and subsequently classified into predefined output, such as verbal
responses of “yes” versus “no”, or movement of a computer mouse cursor (Mason &
Birch, 2003; Wolpaw, Birbaumer, McFarland, Pfurtscheller, & Vaughan, 2002). Braincomputer interfaces based on EEG control signals are recommended for patients with
disorders of consciousness because this signal can be non-invasively acquired at the
bedside with low cost and few medical contraindications (Chatelle, Lesenfants, Guller,
Laureys, & Noirhomme, 2015; Kübler & Kotchoubey, 2007; Naci et al., 2012). To date,
there are two especially noteworthy reports of EEG-based brain-computer interface use
by patients with disorders of consciousness; four patients demonstrated modest
improvements across time in a simple video game (moving a ball to a basket with motor
imagery; Coyle et al., 2015), and four other patients generated enhanced EEG markers of
selective attention to target photos with feedback (Pan et al., 2014). Ultimately, a braincomputer interface could provide a patient with a means to regulate his or her
environment and communicate with other people. Moreover, the most consistently
reported hope from family members of patients with disorders of consciousness is that
the patient’s ability to communicate will be restored (Jox et al., 2015). From a clinical
perspective, a patient is demonstrably capable of producing consistent and appropriate
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responses to commands by executing accurate brain-computer interface control.
Accordingly, brain-computer interfaces for patients with disorders of consciousness can
also fulfil the important diagnostic functions of cognitive assessment and awareness
detection (Boly et al., 2008; Kirschner, Cruse, Chennu, Owen, & Hampshire, 2015;
Rodriguez Moreno, Schiff, Giacino, Kalmar, & Hirsch, 2010).
Unfortunately, there are at least three factors that restrict the development and anticipated
literacy of neuroimaging techniques intended to restore communication with patients who
have disorders of consciousness. Firstly, disorders of consciousness typically arise from
severe and diffuse acquired brain injury (Bernat, 2006). As a consequence, the sensory
and cognitive abilities of all patients with disorders of consciousness are potentially
compromised by their brain injuries and other medical complications (Giacino et al.,
2014; Whyte et al., 2013). For instance, patients with disorders of consciousness are
susceptible to aphasia (Majerus, Bruno, Schnakers, Giacino, & Laureys, 2009), and many
patients with disorders of consciousness lack oculomotor control (Kalmar & Giacino,
2005). Furthermore, the neural mechanisms that underlie the ability to covertly and
overtly follow commands using mental imagery are distinct (Fernández-Espejo, Rossit, &
Owen, 2015; Osborne, Owen, & Fernández-Espejo, 2015). Accordingly, patients with
injuries to the necessary neural circuitry may be unable to generate the brain responses
needed to covertly communicate via mental imagery, despite being able to perform other
cognitive tasks. For these reasons, the mental tasks intended to provide a patient with a
means to communicate should be customized to the patient’s abilities. Consultation with
caregivers and rehabilitation specialists, such as speech pathologists and occupational
therapists, is also advised.
Secondly, it is difficult to use methods intended to detect covert command following as
methods that support functional communication. For example, healthy volunteers
recently participated in both the EEG- and fMRI-based assessments of command
following previously discussed (Cruse et al., 2011; Owen et al., 2006). The sensitivities
of these two techniques were directly compared (Gabriel et al., 2015). In the fMRI
assessments, most participants (85%) demonstrated covert command following, but few
of the participants (60%) reliably communicated. Even fewer volunteers (30%) reliably

14

communicated using EEG (Gabriel et al., 2015). Additionally, many patients with
disorders of consciousness generate brain responses that are variable over time and
delayed relative to healthy volunteers (Bardin et al., 2012; Fellinger et al., 2011; Forgacs
et al., 2014). Single-trial decoding techniques commonly used with brain-computer
interfaces have successfully identified some time-dependent changes in patient data
(King et al., 2013; Pokorny et al., 2013; Sorger, Reithler, Dahmen, & Goebel, 2012).
Unfortunately, these techniques are not yet widely used in assessments of covert
command following. Alternative mental tasks and analysis techniques specifically
developed for future use with brain-computer interfaces are therefore recommended to
improve the likelihood that suitable patients with disorders of consciousness will
communicate using their brain responses.
As a final consideration, it is not yet clear whether any level of confidence in neural data
or brain-computer interface output will be sufficient for medical decision making
(Bendtsen, 2013; Fins et al., 2008; Mackenzie, 2013; Peterson et al., 2013). For
communicative applications, validation studies in healthy volunteers are necessary to
ensure that the neural response of interest correlates with a volitional mental process.
When these responses are subsequently assessed in patients, data quality must be
carefully vetted. For example, most patients with disorders of consciousness lack
voluntary motor control, and artefacts related to movement are common in their neural
data. Similarly, data acquired at the bedside typically feature electrical noise from
surrounding equipment that is especially problematic for EEG. In addition to these
fundamental quality assurance measures, it is also necessary to quantify the likelihood
that the patient generated a pattern of neural activity by chance (the null hypothesis),
rather than in response to task demands (the alternative hypothesis). This quantification
process is best achieved using an appropriate statistical analysis. At the time of writing,
permutation testing is recommended to provide a confidence metric for the classification
of medical information and the communicative output of a brain-computer interface
(Billinger et al., 2013; Cruse et al., 2013; Goldfine et al., 2013; Noirhomme et al., 2014).
Permutation testing estimates the distribution of the null hypothesis from the patient’s
neural data, and thus directly quantifies the likelihood that the observed data arose on the
basis of chance (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007; Nichols & Holmes, 2002). All three of these
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measures are necessary to provide confidence in the quality and validity of any neural
correlate of consciousness intended to inform patient care.

1.3 Summary and aims
Patients with disorders of consciousness exhibit profound behavioural impairments due to
severe brain injury. Patients diagnosed as being in a Minimally Conscious State present
with variable, but reproducible, responses to external stimulation (Giacino et al., 2002).
In contrast, patients in a Vegetative State exhibit no voluntary behaviour and lack
awareness of all external stimulation (Bernat, 2006). These disorders are relatively
uncommon, although reliable prevalence estimates are difficult to obtain due to
variability in international diagnostic criteria and the heterogeneity of the patients
themselves (Jennett, 2002; Pisa et al., 2014). It is very unlikely (although not impossible)
that a patient in a chronic Vegetative State will recover awareness (Multi-Society Task
Force on PVS, 1994a, 1994b). Many of these patients remain severely disabled and
completely dependent on others until the end of their lives (Bernat, 2006). Accordingly,
the diagnosis of the Vegetative State carries significant legal and ethical consequences
(Jennett, 2002).
Unfortunately, it is challenging to differentially diagnose disorders of consciousness.
Careful, repeated assessments are needed to distinguish between reflexive or random
responses and reliable, voluntary responses (Bernat, 2006; Kalmar & Giacino, 2005).
Moreover, a patient’s ability to respond may be comprised by many medical
complications secondary to his or her brain injury (Whyte et al., 2013). To this end,
behavioural examinations have been complemented and supplemented by neuroimaging.
Distinct neural correlates of minimal versus absent awareness have been identified
(Giacino et al., 2014; Laureys, 2005b; Owen, 2013). Most remarkably, a few patients
diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State are able to appropriately and reliably modulate
their brain activity in response to verbal commands (Bardin et al., 2012; Cruse et al.,
2011; Goldfine et al., 2011; Owen et al., 2006). As many as 15% of patients who
completely lack overt responsiveness exhibit this ability to covertly follow commands
(Kondziella et al., 2016).
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A desirable next step for patients with disorders of consciousness is the restoration of
their ability to communicate. The restoration of communication could allow patients to
contribute to their care decisions and direct their activities of daily living (Jox et al.,
2015). Moreover, a patient’s ability to communicate at the bedside may be restored with
EEG-based techniques (Chatelle et al., 2012; Naci et al., 2012). Initial reports of
successful EEG-based brain-computer interface control by patients with disorders of
consciousness are promising (Coyle et al., 2015; Pan et al., 2014). However, patients
have only communicated using fMRI-based techniques so far (Bardin et al., 2012;
Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013; Forgacs et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2010; Naci & Owen,
2013). For these reasons, the primary benefit of neuroimaging techniques for most
patients with disorders of consciousness is cognitive assessment and awareness detection
rather than communication per se.
The primary motivation of this thesis was the development and preliminary validation of
EEG-based techniques to complement existing behavioural and fMRI-based assessments
of patients with disorders of consciousness. All novel techniques were validated in
healthy volunteers and patients with disorders of consciousness, and direct comparisons
of EEG- and fMRI-based approaches were featured in all patient assessments.
Furthermore, paradigms and analysis techniques were designed for future applications as
brain-computer interfaces. Strategies to overcome the limitations of single-subject
analyses of neuroimaging data using subject-specific mental tasks and distinct neural
correlates are discussed in all chapters. Overall, this work provides novel advancements
to the taxonomy of disorders of consciousness and the scientific understanding of
consciousness via acquired brain injury. The specific aims and research questions of each
experimental chapter are discussed in the following subsections.

1.3.1

Do complex and familiar actions enhance the neural
correlates of mental imagery?

In brain-computer interface research involving motor imagery, volunteers are typically
asked to imagine simple movements of their hands or feet (Kübler et al., 2005; Neuper,
Scherer, Wriessnegger, & Pfurtscheller, 2009; Pfurtscheller, Neuper, Brunner, & Lopes
da Silva, 2005). Examples of such actions include squeezing one’s hand into a fist and
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wiggling one’s toes. Unfortunately, some healthy volunteers and patients with severe
motor impairments are unable to sufficiently regulate their brain activity for braincomputer interface control during this type of motor imagery (Blankertz et al., 2010;
Guger, Edlinger, Harkam, Niedermayer, & Pfurtscheller, 2003; Hammer et al., 2011). It
has been proposed that brain responses to imagined familiar and complex actions may be
more consistent and robust and hence comprise better control signals for brain-computer
interface applications (Curran & Stokes, 2003). Indeed, the inclusion of a well-known
sport (tennis) and a familiar environment (one’s home) may have contributed to the
success of the fMRI-based mental imagery tasks previously discussed for patients with
disorders of consciousness (Owen et al., 2006). Moreover, one of the EEG-based
adaptations of that paradigm (Cruse et al., 2011) may have lower sensitivity in healthy
volunteers (Gabriel et al., 2015) because the imagery tasks require participants to engage
in simple imagined hand squeezes and toe wiggles rather than more familiar or complex
actions.
The aim of Chapter 2 was to determine the influence of action complexity and familiarity
on EEG-based motor imagery signals from healthy volunteers (Gibson, Chennu, Owen,
& Cruse, 2014). Groups of experienced pianists, experienced ice hockey players, and
novices performed motor imagery of actions from ice hockey and piano, alongside other
common actions. Experienced athletes and musicians were selected for these experiments
because the effects of motor learning are already well documented in these groups
(Münte, Altenmüller, & Jäncke, 2002; Nakata, Yoshie, Miura, & Kudo, 2010). Indeed,
expertise effects of motor learning in the brain are often described as enhanced
efficiency; experienced athletes and musicians produce more focal patterns of brain
activation than novices (Lotze, Scheler, Tan, Braun, & Birbaumer, 2003; Milton,
Solodkin, Hlustík, & Small, 2007; Wei & Luo, 2010). It was accordingly predicted that
healthy volunteers would generate brain responses that were more consistent in time for
imagined familiar actions than for imagined unfamiliar actions. In terms of action
complexity, imagery of actions that involve more complex motor sequences and multiple
body parts correlates with greater hemodynamic changes in the brain and enhanced
motor-evoked potentials, as compared to imagery of relatively simpler actions (Holper &
Wolf, 2011; Kuhtz-Buschbeck et al., 2003; Roosink & Zijdewind, 2010). It was hence
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predicted that complex motor imagery would correlate with more robust EEG responses
than relatively simpler motor imagery, and that motor imagery of actions that were both
complex and familiar would correlate with the most temporally reliable and robust EEG
responses of all.

1.3.2

Do multiple mental imagery tasks and neuroimaging
modalities increase the likelihood of detecting covert
awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness?

Some patients with disorders of consciousness can volitionally modulate their brain
activity by engaging in mental imagery during assessments with fMRI or EEG. However,
patients with disorders of consciousness have acquired brain injuries and consequently
vary in terms of their sensory and cognitive abilities. Indeed, brain injury may beget
impairments in sensory processing, such as cortical blindness; sensory interpretation and
motor output, as in agnosia, neglect, and apraxia; and higher-order cognition, including
language and executive function (Anderson & Arciniegas, 2010; Satz, 1993). Patients
with disorders of consciousness also vary in terms of their suitability for neuroimaging.
For example, a patient cannot undergo an assessment with MRI if he or she cannot lie flat
without suctioning for airway protection, or if he or she has certain types of metal
implanted in his or her body. Likewise, a patient with a craniotomy (a surgical opening of
the skull) is a poor candidate for assessment with EEG because the scalp above a skull
breach generates aberrant EEG signals (Lee et al., 2010). Furthermore, all patients with
disorders of consciousness can be difficult to assess with neuroimaging because they lack
voluntary motor control; many patients do not remain still long enough to generate
images and other time series of sufficient quality for meaningful analysis. Accordingly,
assessments of several cognitive abilities, supported by spatially distinct brain regions
and indexed by multiple neural signatures, are needed to accurately characterise a
patient’s level of residual cognition and awareness (Gibson, Fernández-Espejo, et al.,
2014).
In Chapter 3, a small cohort of patients with disorders of consciousness participated in
assessments intended to detect covert command following using fMRI- and EEG-based
correlates of mental imagery (Gibson, Fernández-Espejo, et al., 2014). The fMRI
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assessments included a motor imagery task (“imagine playing tennis”) and a mental
imagery task (“imagine visiting all the rooms in your house”; Owen et al., 2006). These
two tasks engage different mental processes and are associated with spatially distinct
patterns of brain activation. Specifically, the motor imagery task requires the participant
to imagine swinging a tennis racket to hit a ball very hard, while the spatial navigation
task requires the participant to visualize the layout and contents of his or her home in
sequence. Consequently, the motor task requires motor planning and is associated with
activation of the supplementary motor area, while the spatial navigation task requires the
retrieval of autobiographical memories and is associated with activation of the
parahippocampal gyrus (Boly et al., 2007; Monti et al., 2010; Owen et al., 2006). The
EEG assessment in Chapter 3 included a conventional motor imagery task (“imagine
squeezing your hand into a fist”; Cruse et al., 2011) and a custom motor imagery task for
each patient. During the custom motor imagery task, patients were asked to imagine
performing an action from a sport or other activity identified as familiar to them by their
caregivers. Together, these three assessments allowed for direct comparisons within and
between mental processes (motor imagery and spatial navigation) and imaging modalities
(fMRI and EEG). In light of the findings of Chapter 2, it was expected that familiar motor
imagery would result in more reliable EEG responses than conventional motor imagery
(Gibson, Chennu, et al., 2014). More importantly, however, it was also expected that
these distinct neural correlates of covert command following would provide corroborative
evidence for each patient’s residual cognitive abilities.

1.3.3

Does somatosensory attention identify awareness in patients
with disorders of consciousness?

The abilities of some patients appropriately categorized as being in a Vegetative State or
Minimally Conscious State vary along a continuum that is not necessarily apparent from
their diagnosis. For example, some patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State
exhibit reflexive startle responses to auditory and visual stimulation, while other patients
do not respond to any external stimulation (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). Just as a given
patient’s behavioural abilities can be quantified using specialized neuropsychological
instruments, the neural correlates of a patient’s abilities can also be characterised in a
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hierarchical fashion. For example, some patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State
differentially process human speech as compared to signal-correlated noise, while other
patients with the same diagnosis only differentially process sound and silence (Beukema
et al., 2016). Several other EEG-based techniques exist to characterise a patient’s ability
to engage in increasingly complex information processing (e.g., Bekinschtein et al., 2009;
Chennu et al., 2013; Faugeras et al., 2012; Fischer, Luaute, & Morlet, 2010; Kotchoubey
et al., 2005). Unfortunately, there are inconsistencies in the prognostic value of these
techniques; for example, some investigators have reported positive prognostic value in
EEG markers of higher-order attentional processing (Lew et al., 2003), while others have
not (Steppacher et al., 2013). These discrepancies may have occurred because patients
with the ability to covertly follow commands (i.e., those in a non-behavioural Minimally
Conscious State) were not identified, or because all approaches primarily relied upon
auditory information (Gibson, Chennu, et al., 2016).
The aim of Chapter 4 was to assess covert cognition in patients with disorders of
consciousness using multi-modal assessments of covert command following and
attentional processing (Gibson, Chennu, et al., 2016). The patients underwent
neuroimaging-based assessments of command following using fMRI. Specifically, the
patients completed the spatial navigation and tennis imagery paradigms previously
described (Owen et al., 2006). Additionally, all patients participated in a novel EEG
paradigm intended to delineate a hierarchy of attentional processing using vibrotactile
stimulation. Healthy volunteers completed the same vibrotactile attention task as a
validation measure. Finally, all patients also completed an fMRI-based auditory selective
attention task. The auditory selective attention paradigm has already been validated in
patients with disorders of consciousness and healthy volunteers (Naci et al., 2013; Naci
& Owen, 2013). Furthermore, the auditory selective attention task has similar demands as
the EEG-based vibrotactile attention paradigm and thus provided an additional validation
measure for the EEG approach. As in Chapter 3, it was expected that these distinct neural
correlates of covert cognition would provide strong evidence for each patient’s abilities.
Finally, it was also expected that the novel EEG technique would corroborate the
identification of patients with the ability to covertly follow commands.
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Chapter 2

2

Complexity and familiarity enhance single-trial
detectability of imagined movements with
electroencephalography

A version of this chapter has been published elsewhere (citation below) and is reproduced
here with permission from the publisher, Elsevier (Appendix B).
Gibson, R. M., Chennu, S., Owen, A. M., & Cruse, D. (2014). Complexity and familiarity
enhance single-trial detectability of imagined movements with electroencephalography.
Clinical Neurophysiology, 125, 1556–1567.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.clinph.2013.11.034

2.1 Introduction
A particular EEG signal called the sensorimotor rhythm is a practical option for braincomputer interfaces intended for use by patients with disorders of consciousness
(Chatelle et al., 2012; Naci et al., 2012). Using as few as four surface electrodes placed
over sensorimotor cortical areas, one can acquire a sensorimotor rhythm as a person
kinaesthetically imagines moving a body part. Sensorimotor rhythms are quantified as
power decreases known as event-related desynchronizations and power increases known
as event-related synchronizations. Sensorimotor rhythms occur in the mu (7−12 Hz) and
beta (13−30 Hz) frequency bands of the human electroencephalogram (Neuper &
Pfurtscheller, 2001; Pfurtscheller & Neuper, 1997). Unlike other EEG-based braincomputer interface paradigms, the imagination tasks used with sensorimotor rhythmbased brain-computer interfaces impose low sensory demands on the user. Of particular
importance for patients who are unable to fixate their eyes, sensorimotor rhythm-based
brain-computer interfaces need not involve visual stimulation (Chatelle et al., 2012;
Grosse-Wentrup & Schölkopf, 2013; Naci et al., 2012). Patients with chronic and
extensive motor impairments, including tetraplegia and advanced Amyotrophic Lateral
Sclerosis, can control sensorimotor rhythm-based brain-computer interfaces (Kübler et
al., 2005; Pfurtscheller, Guger, Müller-Putz, Krausz, & Neuper, 2000). Indeed, patients
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diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State or Minimally Conscious State can produce
sensorimotor rhythms during motor imagery, even after several years of immobility
(Cruse et al., 2011; Goldfine, Victor, Conte, Bardin, & Schiff, 2011; Horki et al., 2014).
Owing in part to this ease of use by patients, brain-computer interfaces based on
responses to motor imagery were the most widely studied type of brain-computer
interface between 2007 and 2011 (Hwang, Kim, Choi, & Im, 2013).
Despite the potential benefits of bedside sensorimotor rhythm-based brain-computer
interfaces for patients with disorders of consciousness, there is substantial intra- and
inter-subject variability in sensorimotor rhythm-based brain-computer interface
performance (Naci et al., 2012; Pfurtscheller, Brunner, Schlögl, & Lopes da Silva, 2006;
Wolpaw, Birbaumer, McFarland, Pfurtscheller, & Vaughan, 2002). For reliable
communication, classification accuracy of 70% is regarded as the lower limit of
acceptable performance (Kübler et al., 2001). In 2003, about 49 of 100 healthy volunteers
did not achieve performance accuracy above 70% with a simple sensorimotor rhythmbased brain-computer interface (Guger, Edlinger, Harkam, Niedermayer, & Pfurtscheller,
2003). In 2011, modest improvements were evident in an updated sensorimotor rhythmbased brain-computer interface paradigm, such that only 30 of 80 volunteers did not
achieve performance accuracy above 70% (Hammer et al., 2011). Unfortunately, some
healthy volunteers and patients are still unable to achieve sufficient brain-computer
interface control for communication via motor imagery, even using state-of-the-art
sensorimotor rhythm-based brain-computer interfaces with optimized feedback protocols
and online processing of the EEG data (e.g., Ang & Guan, 2017; Roussel, Negishi, &
Mitsukura, 2016; Sollfrank et al., 2016). This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as
brain-computer interface illiteracy, and it is estimated to affect about 10 to 30% of
potential healthy users (Vidaurre & Blankertz, 2010). Brain-computer interface illiteracy
is especially problematic for devices intended to restore communication to patients with
disorders of consciousness because only a small portion (15%) of these patients are likely
to have the covert cognitive abilities needed for brain-computer interface control
(Kondziella, Friberg, Frokjaer, Fabricius, & Møller, 2016).
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To address brain-computer interface illiteracy, some researchers have proposed that
alterations should be made to the mental tasks used to drive sensorimotor rhythm-based
brain-computer interfaces (Curran et al., 2004; Curran & Stokes, 2003; Scherer et al.,
2015). In published sensorimotor rhythm-based brain-computer interface research to date,
users are typically instructed to imagine moving their hands, feet, or tongue (Kübler et
al., 2005; Neuper & Pfurtscheller, 2001; Pfurtscheller et al., 2006). With only a few
exceptions, users are asked to imagine very simple actions, such as repeatedly squeezing
one of their hands into a fist. However, actions that are more complex or familiar could
result in a more robust and consistent sensorimotor rhythm (Curran et al., 2004; Curran &
Stokes, 2003). Similarly, comparisons in traditional sensorimotor rhythm-based braincomputer interface research are often made between the sensorimotor rhythms generated
for different imagined movements, such as the left versus right hands (Cruse et al., 2011;
Guger et al., 2003; Kübler et al., 2005). Although these comparisons render acceptable
classification accuracy in most healthy people (Bai et al., 2008; Guger et al., 2003), these
types of comparisons may not be optimal for patients diagnosed with disorders of
consciousness. Indeed, a patient’s ability to exhibit a particular voluntary action in
response to command is the criteria for awareness during the administration of the Coma
Recovery Scale (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). If the patient is able to successfully
demonstrate that action on three out of four occasions, the patient is diagnosed as at least
minimally conscious (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). Accordingly, contrasts in this chapter
were made between one imagined action and periods of rest (mind-wandering), rather
than between two distinct imagined actions. This technique is more practical for patients
who are behaviourally non-responsive because sustaining more than one imagined action
in working memory may impose excessive cognitive demands on some patients.
Furthermore, this technique allows for an EEG-based assessment that is similar to
standard clinical tools.
In a series of three experiments, healthy, young adults imagined actions of varying
complexity and familiarity during EEG recordings. All tasks employed an experimental
set-up suitable for future clinical applications at the bedside. It was hypothesized that
motor imagery involving more complex and familiar movements than previous
investigations would improve classification accuracy and result in more users with
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sensorimotor rhythms that could be reliably detected. If supported, the hypotheses of
these three experiments could be extended to future clinical work with imagery tasks
catered to the skills and hobbies of the target patient user.
In Experiment 1 (Complexity), participants imagined simple hand actions (squeezes) of
the sort typically used with sensorimotor rhythm-based brain-computer interfaces,
alongside other more complex bimanual actions. Following previous work, “complex”
motor imagery is defined as imagined actions that involve sequences of movements and
more than one body part (Holper & Wolf, 2011). In accordance with prior evidence of
increased brain activity during complex motor imagery (Holper & Wolf, 2011; KuhtzBuschbeck et al., 2003; Roosink & Zijdewind, 2010), it was predicted that classification
accuracy (versus rest) would be higher when the participant imagined complex actions
than when the participant imagined relatively simpler actions.
In Experiment 2 (Familiarity), groups of experienced pianists, experienced ice hockey
players, and age-matched controls imagined squeezing their hands and performing
actions from hockey and piano. This experiment featured experienced athletes and
musicians because the effects of long-term motor learning have been extensively studied
in these groups (Münte, Altenmüller, & Jäncke, 2002; Nakata, Yoshie, Miura, & Kudo,
2010). Relative to novices, experienced athletes and musicians produce more focused
patterns of brain activation (Lotze, Scheler, Tan, Braun, & Birbaumer, 2003; Milton,
Solodkin, Hlustík, & Small, 2007; Olsson, Jonsson, Larsson, & Nyberg, 2008; Wei &
Luo, 2010). Expert athletes and musicians also report more objectively accurate imagery
than novices (Louis, Collet, Champely, & Guillot, 2012; Rieger, 2012). Accordingly, it
was predicted that classification accuracy between rest and imagery would be highest for
the athletes and musicians during the action with which they were most familiar, i.e.,
pianists imagining playing the piano, and hockey players imagining playing hockey
(Fourkas, Bonavolontà, Avenanti, & Aglioti, 2008; Lotze et al., 2003; Olsson et al.,
2008; Wei & Luo, 2010).
In Experiment 3 (Complexity and Familiarity), a potential synergistic influence of
imagined action complexity and familiarity on the sensorimotor rhythm was examined.
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Specifically, the experienced pianists from Experiment 2 imagined playing one simple
piece of music and one relatively more complex piece of music on the piano. It was
expected that classification accuracy would be highest for the complex piece versus rest
comparison.

2.2 Materials and methods
2.2.1
2.2.1.1

Participants and stimuli
Experiment 1: Complexity

Sixteen healthy, right-handed young adults participated in the complexity study (five
men; age range=17-20 years; median age of 18 years). For the simple imagined
movement phase, the participants were instructed to imagine repeatedly squeezing their
left hand, right hand, or both hands following the auditory cues of “left”, “right”, and
“both”, respectively. For the complex imagined movements phase, the participants were
instructed to imagine either playing the guitar, clapping their hands, or juggling using
both hands. These tasks were cued with the words “guitar”, “clap”, and “juggle”,
respectively. In each task phase, participants were also asked to mind-wander following
the cue “relax”. The order of the simple and complex imagined movement phases was
counter-balanced across participants. All auditory instructions were 1-second in length.

2.2.1.2

Experiment 2: Familiarity

Forty-eight healthy, right-handed young adults participated in the familiarity study.
Sixteen participants were experienced ice hockey players (seven men; age range=18-29
years; median age of 20 years); sixteen participants were experienced pianists (six men;
age range=18-29 years; median age of 20 years); and sixteen participants had either
limited or no experience playing the piano or hockey (eight men; age range=18-28 years;
median age of 18 years). All hockey players had regularly played competitive ice hockey
for at least ten years. All pianists had formal musical training and had regularly played
and practiced piano for at least ten years.
There were no significant differences in mean age of first play experience, mean years of
total play experience, or mean self-reported hours of regular play per week between the
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groups of athletes and musicians, pairwise ps>.51 (Bonferroni correction; Table 3). There
were also no group differences in handedness (Oldfield, 1971), imagery ability (Gregg,
Hall, & Butler, 2010), age, or sex, ps >.34 (Table 3). All participants were instructed to
imagine making a slap shot (a bimanual action from hockey), playing a musical piece on
the piano using both hands, or squeezing their right hand into a fist following the auditory
cues of “hockey”, “piano”, and “right hand”, respectively. As in Experiment 1,
participants were asked to mind-wander following the cue “relax”, and all instructions
were 1-second in length.

2.2.1.3

Experiment 3: Complexity and Familiarity

The experienced pianists (n=16) from Experiment 2 completed Experiment 3 in the same
recording session. In Experiment 3, the pianists were instructed to imagine playing
ascending and descending C-major scales and B-major arpeggios over two octaves using
both hands following the auditory cues of “scale” and “arpeggio”. The pieces of music
were selected based on the curriculum of the Royal Conservatory of Music, which is a
prominent musical education institution in Canada. In this curriculum, piano students are
evaluated on scales and the key of C-major from the first grade level; arpeggios from the
fourth grade level; and the key of B-major from the seventh grade level (Royal
Conservatory of Music, 2008). Given the different grade levels at which the C-major
scale and B-major arpeggio are evaluated in the Royal Conservatory of Music
curriculum, the B-major arpeggio represents a more complex action than the C-major
scale. The pianists reported high familiarity with both pieces and recalled both pieces
from memory. As in Experiment 1, the participants were instructed to mind-wander
following the cue “relax”, and all instructions were 1-second in length. The Experiment 3
procedure was always conducted following the Experiment 2 procedure to prevent
pianists from selecting the musical pieces from Experiment 3 for the piano imagery in
Experiment 2.
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Table 3. Demographic and other measures for Experiments 2 and 3 of Chapter 2.
Pianists

Hockey Players

Controls

Total

M ± SD

M ± SD

M ± SD

M ± SD

n

16

16

16

48

Sex (# male)

6

7

8

21

Variable
Demographics

Age (years)

20.6 ± 2.9

20.9 ± 3.4

19.4 ± 2.7

20.3 ± 3.0

70.9 ± 14.7

70.9 ± 21.9

67.8 ± 20.7

69.9 ± 19.0

1.6 ± 3.0

5.0 ± 1.7*, b

2.6 ± 4.2

3.1 ± 3.4

Total years

0.9 ± 1.8

***

0.4 ± 0.9

5.6 ± 7.4

Hours per week

0.5 ± 2.0

9.2 ± 4.5***

Laterality Quotient

a

Hockey Experience b
Initial age (years)

Number of other sports played
Piano Experience

15.4 ± 3.4

1.5 ± 1.2

0.8 ± 2.0

3.5 ± 5.1

*

2.4 ± 1.6

2.3 ± 1.5

2.9 ± 1.5

c

5.4 ± 2.0†

Initial age (years)

1.6 ± 3.4

3.7 ± 6.7

3.6 ± 4.7

***

0.5 ± 1.2

0.6 ± 1.4

5.3 ± 7.1

Hours per week

8.9 ± 3.8***

0.3 ± 0.7

0.6 ± 1.3

3.2 ± 4.7

Number of other instruments played

1.6 ± 1.0***

0.3 ± 0.5

0.7 ± 0.6

0.9 ± 0.9

Kinaesthetic

5.2 ± 1.0

5.1 ± 1.1

4.8 ± 1.3

5.0 ± 1.1

Visual

5.8 ± 1.0

5.6 ± 1.4

5.4 ± 1.0

5.6 ± 1.1

3.7 ± 0.6

3.8 ± 0.7

3.8 ± 0.8

Total years

Imagery Ability

14.8 ± 3.6

d

Self-report ratings of imagery
Vividness e

3.9 ± 1.0 f
4.2 ± 1.1

g

Notes. M=mean; SD=standard deviation.
a

The Laterality Quotient is a measurement of handedness (Oldfield, 1971).

b

Four pianists reported some leisure experience playing hockey (2-5 years total experience initiated at ages
5-8), and four controls reported some leisure experience playing hockey (1-3 years total experience initiated
at ages 5-13).
c

Three hockey players reported some leisure experience playing piano (1-4 years total experience initiated at
ages 7-10), and five controls reported some leisure experience playing piano (0.5-5 years total experience
initiated at ages 5-22).
d

Performance on the Movement Imagination Questionnaire-Revised Second version (Gregg et al., 2010)

e

Responses to the following question: "Please rate the overall vividness of your imagined actions during the
task, such that: 1=not at all vivid, 2=slightly vivid, 3=somewhat vivid, 4=moderately vivid, 5=very vivid"
f

Responses from the pianists for the Experiment 2 imagery

g

Responses from the pianists for the Experiment 3 imagery

***

p<.001; *p<.05; †p<.1.
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2.2.2

Procedure

Before the EEG recording session, each participant completed a series of questionnaires.
All participants completed the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) and the
Movement Imagery Questionnaire-Revised Second version (Gregg et al., 2010).
Participants in Experiments 2 and 3 also completed a questionnaire regarding their
experiences playing hockey, piano, and other sports and instruments. After Experiments 2
and 3, participants rated the vividness of their imagined actions using a 5-point Likert
scale (Table 3).
All auditory cues were pre-recorded by a female speaker and presented to the participant
using ER-1 insert earphones (Etymōtic Research Inc., Elk Grove Village, IL). Each trial
began with an auditory cue and was followed by 5 to 8 seconds of silence before the
onset of the next auditory cue. The duration of the silent interval was randomly selected
from a uniform distribution on each trial. Experiments 1 and 2 were completed in four
blocks of 48 trials (12 trials of each instruction per block). Experiment 3 was completed
in three blocks of 48 trials (16 trials of each instruction per block), as there were only
three (rather than four) trial types in the latter task. Each block of 48 trials was
approximately six minutes in duration. All trials were presented in a pseudorandom order
such that no more than two cues of the same type were consecutively presented, and the
first trial of each block was always an imagined action trial (rather than a ‘relax’ trial).
Participants were provided with short breaks between blocks to reduce fatigue.
Participants were also instructed to imagine completing each action repeatedly from the
offset of the auditory cue to the onset of the next auditory cue. This instruction was
intended to account for potential differences in the duration of the imagined actions.

2.2.3

Data acquisition and pre-processing

In all three studies, the EEG data were recorded using the g.Gamma active electrode
system (g.tec Medical Engineering GmbH, Austria). In Experiment 1, the EEG data were
recorded with a four-channel montage housed in an electrode cap; the electrodes were
placed at sites CP3, FC3, CP4, and FC4 (Sharbrough et al., 1991). In Experiments 2 and
3, the EEG data were recorded from the same four scalp sites as in Experiment 1, and

43

additional electrodes were placed at sites TP7, FT7, CPz, FCz, TP8, and FT8
(Sharbrough et al., 1991). The reported analyses for Experiments 2 and 3 consist of data
from only the four electrodes used in Experiment 1, following previous work (Cruse et
al., 2012; Guger et al., 2003).
The EEG signals were acquired using a g.USBamp amplifier operating through a USB
2.0 port. Stimuli presentation and physiological data recordings were performed using a
Simulink® model in Matlab (Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA). Simulink® ensures the
precise synchronization of EEG activity with cue onset/offset (Guger et al., 2001). In all
three studies, bipolar surface electromyographic recordings were obtained from the
ventral surface of the forearms to detect overt movements. Online, the EEG data were
filtered from 0.5 to 60 Hz with a 60 Hz notch filter using an infinite impulse response
digital Butterworth filter. The electromyographic data were filtered from 5 to 250 Hz
with a 60 Hz notch filter. The EEG recordings were referenced to the right earlobe with a
forehead (Fpz) ground, and the right elbow was used for the electromyographic ground.
All data were sampled at 600 Hz with impedances below 5 kΩ at the beginning of the
EEG recording.
Offline data processing was conducted with EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The
EEG data were down-sampled to 100 Hz, filtered between 0.5 and 40 Hz using the
EEGLAB function ‘pop_eegfilt’, and segmented into 6-second epochs time-locked to the
onset of the auditory cue. The EEGLAB filter function consisted of a two-step leastsquares finite impulse response filter. The data were first filtered with a high-pass cut-off
of 0.5 Hz, and the data were then filtered with a low-pass cut-off of 40 Hz. The
electromyographic data were rectified and then filtered with a 10 Hz high pass filter using
the same EEGLAB least-squares filter function previously described. Trials containing
physiological artefacts, including overt hand movements as evident from the
electromyographic data, were identified by visual inspection and removed. After artefact
rejection, the median number of trials included in each imagery and rest condition per
participant was: 40 in Experiment 1 (range=29−48); 43 in Experiment 2 (range=27−48);
and 43 in Experiment 3 (range=28−48). Finally, the EEG data were re-referenced offline
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to form two bipolar channels (FC3−CP3, FC4−CP4) that are subsequently identified as
C3’ and C4’, respectively.

2.2.4

Single-trial classification

A machine-learning algorithm was used for single-trial classification of the EEG data
(Cruse et al., 2011, 2012). For these analyses, the log band power values of four
frequency bands at electrodes C3’ and C4’ were the classification features. Based on
previous work (Cruse et al., 2011, 2012), the frequency bands were: 7 to 13 Hz (mu); 13
to 19 Hz (low-beta); 19 to 25 Hz (mid-beta); and 25 to 30 Hz (high-beta), for a total of
eight features per classification analysis (two electrodes x four frequency bands). For the
single-trial analyses, the spectral power in each band was estimated with a sliding 1second Hamming window moving in 50-ms steps and using a short time Fourier
transform (Matlab function ‘spectrogram’; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999).
Classification of each imagined action and the corresponding rest condition was
performed using a naïve Bayes classifier (Matlab’s ‘naivebayes’ object). Each
classification analysis was conducted using ten-fold cross-validation. For the crossvalidation procedure, each participant’s trials for one type of imagined action and the rest
condition from the same experiment were separated into ten groups approximately equal
in size. The naïve Bayes classifier was trained on the features of nine of these groups
(training), and then the class of each trial in the tenth group was predicted to calculate the
classifier’s accuracy (testing). Specifically, during training, the naïve Bayes classifier
estimated the parameters of a probability distribution per training feature per class. The
parameters of this probability distribution were the mean and standard deviation of a
normal distribution; the training features were power per frequency band at each
electrode; and the two classes were the rest and imagery trial types. Using Bayes’
Theorem during testing, the features of the test trials were used to calculate the posterior
probabilities for each class, and then each test trial was placed in the class with the
highest posterior probability (Jiang, Wang, Cai, & Yan, 2007). The classification
procedure was repeated ten times so that each trial served as a test trial in exactly one of
the ten cross-validation folds. The average classification accuracy across the ten folds
was then calculated at each time-point. Finally, the time-course of the cross-validated
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classification accuracy was smoothed with a sliding window of 500 ms to control for
outliers (Cruse et al., 2012).
To determine the statistical significance of the classification accuracy, a permutation test
with 1,000 repetitions was used (Cruse et al., 2012; Maris, 2004). For each permutation,
the class labels of imagery or rest were shuffled across trials, and the cross-validated
classification procedure previously described was repeated. The maximum smoothed
accuracies across all time-points from each of the 1,000 repetitions were used to form a
distribution representing the expected classification results if the classifier were operating
at chance (the null hypothesis). The classification accuracy obtained for the participant’s
original data (i.e., the data with the correct trial labels) was then evaluated against this
distribution. This comparison step enabled the calculation of a familywise error-corrected
significance value for the original classification results at each time-point. Finally, to
control for the multiple comparisons of band power (i.e., one comparison for each time
point of imagery versus rest), a control of False Discovery Rate approach was used
implemented via Matlab’s ‘fdr’ function (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995; Verhoeven,
Simonsen, & Mcintyre, 2005). The control of False Discovery Rate approach reduces the
risk of Type I error without requiring as stringent reductions in power as Bonferroni
procedures (Verhoeven et al., 2005).

2.2.5

Time-frequency analyses

In addition to the single-trial classification analyses of the data, the EEG data from all
three studies were analysed using the same spectral analysis procedure reported
elsewhere (Cruse et al., 2012). For each time-point at C3’ and C4’, spectral power
estimates were calculated using a 1-second Hanning window time-frequency
transformation via the ‘ft_freqstatistics’ function of the open-source Matlab toolbox,
FieldTrip (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). The time-frequency data at
both electrodes were then compared between the imagined movements and rest using
cluster-based permutation testing implemented via FieldTrip (Cruse et al., 2012; Maris &
Oostenveld, 2007). For the cluster-based testing, the time-frequency data for a given
imagery condition and rest (or another imagery condition, as in Experiment 3) were logtransformed and then compared at each data point by a paired-samples t test. All
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significant data points (p<.025) were then arranged into groups, i.e., clusters, based on
their temporal and spectral proximity to each other. The sum of the t values was then
calculated for each cluster. To determine the familywise error-corrected significance for
each summed t value, a Monte Carlo randomization test that controlled for familywise
error was used. In the randomization test, the condition labels were permuted to remove
task-related differences, and the clustering procedure was repeated 1,000 times. The
maximum summed clusters from these repetitions were used to form a distribution, and
this distribution was then used to test the null hypothesis that the original summed t value
(i.e., the summed t value computed from the data with the correct trial labels) occurred by
chance.

2.2.6

Group-level statistics

For the single-trial analyses of the EEG data, all group-level statistical analyses were
conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics version 21.0. The Dunn-Sidak correction was used
for the follow-up tests. For the spectral analyses of the EEG data, all statistical analyses
were conducted using the cluster-based permutation testing previously described via
custom Matlab script and FieldTrip (Cruse et al., 2012; Maris & Oostenveld, 2007;
Oostenveld et al., 2011).
For the group comparisons of the single-trial analyses, several parametric and nonparametric repeated-measures statistical tests were used. Paired-samples t tests were used
to compare maximum classification accuracy and the time at which maximum
classification accuracy occurred relative to the onset of the instruction in both
Experiments 1 and 3. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests were used to compare the number of
time-points for which a statistically reliable classification was obtained in the same two
studies. This test was also used to compare the self-reported vividness ratings of the
imagined actions from the pianists between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. An exact
(rather than asymptotic) calculation of the p value was used with the test of time-points in
Experiment 1 to account for the positive skew of the count data (given that many
participants had zero statistically reliable time-points). Finally, the number of trials
included in each complexity condition of each study was compared using the Friedman
test.
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To further illustrate the difference between the single-trial analyses of the complexity
effects in Experiments 1 and 3, participants were assigned to a binary category based on
whether at least one imagined movement in each complexity condition was classified
from rest with a statistically reliable result (0=no statistically reliable classifications). The
number of participants with at least one statistically reliable classification and the number
of participants with no statistically reliable classifications in each complexity level were
then compared using Fisher’s Exact Test.
For Experiment 2, three separate 3 (Group: Pianist, Hockey, Control) x 3 (Action: Play
Piano, Slap-shot, Squeeze) mixed analyses of variance were used to compare the
averaged maximum classification accuracies, the time at which the maximum accuracy
occurred, and the total number of trials included in each condition (N.B., the trial
numbers were rank-transformed to meet the statistical assumptions of the analysis).
Additionally, a Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to compare the self-reported imagery
vividness ratings between the groups. Given that classification accuracy did not
statistically differ between conditions in Experiment 2, no comparisons were made for
the number of time points that were classified with a statistically reliable result.
The group spectral analyses were conducted with the time-frequency data averaged
across all trials in each condition per participant. For Experiment 1, the time-frequency
data for each participant were averaged across the three imagined actions in each of the
two complexity levels, i.e., simple and complex imagery. The cluster-based permutation
testing was then conducted between each complexity level and rest, and between the two
complexity levels (Figure 1). For Experiment 2, comparisons were separately made for
each familiarity group between each imagery condition and rest (Figure 3). For
Experiment 3, comparisons were made between each of the two imagery conditions and
rest, and between the two imagery conditions (Figure 4). Post-hoc comparisons were also
conducted between the piano imagery in Experiments 2 and 3.

48

2.3 Results
2.3.1

Experiment 1: Complexity

In terms of the single-trial analyses of the EEG data, there was a trend for classification
accuracy to be higher for the complex imagined actions than the simple imagined actions,
t(15)=-1.963, p=.068, d=0.49 (Simple: Mean(M)=60.68%, Standard Error (SE)=0.74%;
Complex: M= 62.74%, SE=0.93%). There was no statistical difference for the time at
which the maximum classification accuracy occurred between the two complexity
conditions, p=0.29. From the familywise permutation tests, there were more time-points
at which statistically reliable classifications were obtained in the complex condition than
in the simple condition, Z=-2.197, exact p=.026, r=.55 (Simple: median of zero
statistically reliable time-points [range: 0-26]; Complex: median of 14.5 statistically
reliable time-points [range: 0-31]). There was also no statistically reliable difference in
the number of trials in the two complexity levels, p=.29.
There was some variability between and within subjects for the single-trial analyses.
While at least one simple imagined action type was classified from rest with a statistically
reliable outcome for only four of the participants (25% of the sample), at least one
complex imagined action type was classified from rest with a statistically reliable
outcome for more participants (11 of 16, or 69%), Fisher’s exact p=.032 (two-tailed).
Notably, there were some participants in the sample who did not produce any statistically
reliable sensorimotor rhythms for any of the imagined actions (25% of the sample). This
portion of the sample could reflect the estimated 10 to 30% of users designated as ‘braincomputer interface illiterate’ in previous work (Vidaurre & Blankertz, 2010). The interand intra-subject variability in classification accuracy is summarized in Table 4 and
detailed in the supplementary data tables (Appendix C).
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Table 4. Summary of the single-trial classification outcomes in Chapter 2.
Experiment 1 (Complexity; n=16)

Simple Imagery
Right Hand vs. Rest

Left Hand vs. Rest

Both Hands vs. Rest

Maximum Time of
Maximum Time of
Duration ns
Duration ns
Accuracy Maximum
Accuracy Maximum
M
60.61
2.59
3.63
2
60.15
2.22
1.75 1
SE
0.97
0.29
2.50
0.70
0.37
0.94 -

Maximum Time of
Duration ns
Accuracy Maximum
61.27
2.85
6.25 4
0.93
0.33
3.46 -

Complex Imagery
Juggle vs. Rest

Guitar vs. Rest

Clap vs. Rest

Maximum Time of
Maximum Time of
Duration ns
Duration ns
Accuracy Maximum
Accuracy Maximum
M
62.71
2.79
9.31
8
63.83
2.42
15.06 7
SE
1.07
0.24
3.67
1.58
0.32
6.19 -

Maximum Time of
Duration ns
Accuracy Maximum
61.67
2.44
6.06 7
1.23
0.33
2.63 -

Experiment 2 (Familiarity; n=48)

Piano vs. Rest

Hockey vs. Rest

Hand Squeeze vs. Rest

Maximum Time of
Maximum Time of
Duration ns
Duration ns
Accuracy Maximum
Accuracy Maximum
Pianists (n=16)
M
63.31
SE
1.49

2.76
0.24

Maximum Time of
Duration ns
Accuracy Maximum

16.31
5.99

7
-

62.74
1.38

2.27
0.35

9.88
4.69

8
-

60.76
1.05

2.45
0.33

6.19
2.96

7
-

2.25
0.31

3.88
1.95

4
-

60.34
1.64

2.31
0.24

5.50
2.95

4
-

59.52
1.02

2.35
0.28

4.69
2.80

4
-

2.35
0.27

12.94
5.70

8
-

63.75
1.38

2.18
0.26

11.69
4.82

9
-

63.69
1.37

2.25
0.33

12.06
4.53

8
-

Hockey Players (n=16)
M
SE

59.23
0.98

Controls (n=16)
M
63.12
SE
1.49

Experiment 3 (Complexity and Familiarity; n=16)

Simple Music (Scale) vs. Rest

M
SE

Maximum Time of
Accuracy Maximum
66.34
2.61
1.96
0.19

Complex Music (Arpeggio) vs. Rest

Duration

ns

23.19
7.18

9
-

Maximum
Accuracy
69.60
2.03

Time of
Maximum
2.51
0.28

Duration

ns

33.69
7.10

13
-

Notes. Maximum Accuracy=maximum cross-validated classification accuracy (%); Time
of Maximum=time at which Maximum Accuracy occurred (seconds following the offset
of the auditory cue); Duration=number of time points for which statistically reliable
classification results were obtained; ns=number of participants for which statistically
reliable classifications were obtained; M=mean; SE=standard error.
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From the group spectral analyses of the EEG data (Figure 1), there were statistically
reliable event-related desynchronizations over the left hemisphere in the low-beta band in
the complex imagery versus rest comparison (ps<.014). In the simple imagery versus rest
comparison, there was an event-related desynchronization over the right hemisphere in
the mid-beta band that approached statistical significance (p=.050). Additionally, there
were no statistically reliable clusters in the simple imagery versus complex imagery
comparisons (ps>.10).

Figure 1. Outcomes of the group spectral analyses in Experiment 1 of Chapter 2.
Averaged, group (n=16) time-frequency plots from the spectral analyses of the EEG data
for Experiment 1 (Complexity) averaged across the three imagined actions in each
imagery condition. The range of power values (log ratio difference) that are plotted is
±0.6121. Significant clusters (ps<.014) are outlined with solid lines; dashed lines
highlight a cluster with p=.050. Time is measured relative to the offset of the instruction.
Although the role of action familiarity was not explicitly examined in Experiment 1, there
was one interesting finding in this experiment that emphasized the potential influence of
prior experience on single-subject performance. In Figure 2, the time-course of the
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single-trial classification accuracies for one of two experienced guitarists who
participated in Experiment 1 is depicted. In line with the group trends already reported,
these participants did not produce sensorimotor rhythms that were classified from rest
with statistical reliability for any of the simple imagined actions. The averaged,
maximum classification accuracy obtained for these participants during simple motor
imagery was 57.58% (SE=1.01%). Moreover, the classification results for the simple
imagery versus rest comparisons were not statistically reliable at any time-point for either
participant. Both participants produced sensorimotor rhythms for the instruction to
imagine clapping that were reliably classified from rest for a short time (six to seven
time-points with smoothed maximum classification accuracy of 64.79%±3.52%, no
figure provided, and 64.47%±4.04%, as shown in Figure 2). Most interestingly, however,
both participants produced a markedly robust sensorimotor rhythm for the instruction to
imagine playing the guitar. These sensorimotor rhythms were classified from rest for
most of the epoch (68-69 time-points) with very high accuracy (maximum accuracies of
81.10%, SE=3.44%, as shown in Figure 2, and 71.28%, SE=3.97%, no figure provided).

Figure 2. Single-trial analyses for a musician in Experiment 1 of Chapter 2.
Mean smoothed, cross-validated classification accuracy from the EEG single-trial
analyses from an experienced guitar player who participated in Experiment 1
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(Complexity). Time is measured relative to the offset of the instruction. Shaded regions
depict ±1 standard error of the mean, and stars denote time-points with statistically
reliable classification results.

2.3.2

Experiment 2: Familiarity

In terms of the single-trial analyses of the EEG data, there were no statistically reliable
differences in accuracy for any of the imagined action versus rest comparisons, or for any
group on any of the imagined action versus rest comparisons, ps>.44 (Table 4 and
Appendix C). The main effect of group on accuracy approached statistical significance
(p=.054), and this was driven by the relatively low overall classification accuracy of the
hockey players (M=59.70%, SE=1.03%) compared to the control group (M=63.52%,
SE=1.24%; pairwise p=.054). There were no statistically reliable differences in terms of
the time at which maximum classification accuracy occurred for any imagined action or
any group by imagined action type, ps>.64. There was also no statistically reliable
difference in the number of trials included in any of the imagined action types or rest
conditions on average or by group, ps>.41. Finally, the three groups did not differ in their
self-reported vividness ratings of the imagined actions, p=.34, or in motor imagery ability
as measured by the Movement Imagery Questionnaire (ps>.545; Table 3).
In the group spectral analyses of the EEG data (Figure 3), there were statistically reliable
event-related desynchronizations for the familiar imagery versus rest comparisons for
both the experienced pianists (ps<0.015) and the experienced hockey players (ps<0.019).
Although the event-related desynchronizations were statistically reliable bilaterally
(rather than unilaterally) and over a longer period for the pianists, the statistically reliable
event-related desynchronizations were similar between the hockey players and pianists
during imagery of familiar actions. Specifically, these event-related desynchronizations
featured statistically reliable clusters in both the low-mu (8−10 Hz) and low-beta (13−19
Hz) bands. However, the pianists also had statistically reliable event-related
desynchronizations for the hockey imagery (ps<.017) and the simple imagery (ps<0.017),
and the hockey players had an event-related desynchronization that approached statistical
significance (p=.036, two-tailed) for the simple imagery. Furthermore, the control group
also produced statistically significant event-related desynchronizations for both the piano
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(p=.021) and hockey imagery (p=.002). There were no statistically reliable clusters in
any of the other comparisons (ps>0.08). Thus, none of the imagined actions conferred a
clear advantage in terms of sensorimotor rhythm detection for any group of participants,
regardless of their familiarity (or lack thereof) with the imagined action.

Figure 3. Outcomes of the group spectral analyses in Experiment 2 of Chapter 2.
Averaged, group time-frequency plots from the spectral analyses of the EEG data for
Experiment 2 (Familiarity) by imagery versus rest comparison per familiarity group
(n=16 per group). The range of power values (log ratio difference) that are plotted is
±0.6121. Statistically reliable clusters (ps<.021) are outlined with solid lines; dashed lines
highlight a cluster with p=.036. Time is measured relative to the offset of the instruction.

2.3.3

Experiment 3: Complexity and familiarity

In terms of classification accuracy for the experiment only involving pianists, there was
an advantage for the complex imagined action (Complex: M=69.60%, SE=2.03%)
compared to the simple imagined action (Simple: M=66.34%, SE=1.96%; t(15)=-2.589,
p=.021, d=0.65). Furthermore, more time-points were classified from rest for the
complex imagery compared to the simple imagery, Z=-2.510, p=.009 (two-tailed), r=.63
(Simple: median of 9 time-points [range: 0-76]; Complex: median of 32 time-points
[range: 0-74]). However, there was no difference between the number of pianists with
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statistically reliable imagery versus rest comparisons in the two complexity levels,
Fisher’s exact p=0.25. There also was no statistically reliable difference in terms of when
the maximum classification accuracy occurred relative to the onset of the auditory cue,
p=.72. The differences between the complexity conditions were not driven by a
difference in the number of trials in either condition, p=.16. Notably, there was also no
difference between the self-reported vividness of the imagined actions in Experiment 3
compared to Experiment 2, p=.10.

Figure 4. Outcomes of the group spectral analyses in Experiment 3 of Chapter 2.
Averaged, group (n=16) time-frequency plots from the spectral analyses of the EEG data
from Experiment 3 (Complexity and Familiarity) by comparison. The range of power
values (log ratio difference) that are plotted is ±0.6121. Statistically reliable clusters
(p<.017) are outlined with solid lines; dashed lines highlight clusters with p=.044 (C3’)
and p=.038 (C4’). Time is measured relative to the offset of the instruction.
The results of the group spectral analyses are shown in Figure 4 for each comparison.
Compared with rest, statistically reliable event-related desynchronizations (ps<.017)
occurred in the low-mu and low-beta bands over the left hemisphere and in the low-,
mid-, and high-beta bands over the right hemisphere for the simple imagery versus rest
comparison. For the complex imagery versus rest comparison, a similar response was
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observed with the same time-course, although the event-related desynchronizations were
statistically reliable over both hemispheres throughout the low-mu and the low- and midbeta bands (ps<.011). In a comparison of the two imagery conditions, there was more of a
desynchronization bilaterally for the complex imagery in the low-mu and low-beta bands
that approached statistical significance (ps=.044 [C3’] and .038 [C4’]).
As an exploratory post-hoc test, classification accuracy was compared for the
sensorimotor rhythms generated when the pianists imagined playing a musical piece of
their choice (Experiment 2) versus two specific musical pieces (Experiment 3). This
analysis resulted in a significant effect of movement type, F(15)=16.016, p=.001,
ηp2=.361, that was driven by the lower classification accuracy for the piano imagery in
Experiment 2 compared to the complex piano imagery in Experiment 3 (p=.003;
Complex Musical Piece [Experiment 3]: M=69.60%, SE=2.03%; Musical Piece of Choice
[Experiment 2]: M=63.31%, SE=1.49%; other pairwise ps>.06).

2.4 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter, healthy volunteers, including experienced hockey players and pianists,
imagined actions of varying complexity and familiarity in a series of motor imagery
paradigms evaluated using EEG. The purpose of this work was to increase the likelihood
that reliable and robust sensorimotor rhythms would be detected at the single-subject
level. In future work, these manipulations will be applied to sensorimotor rhythm-based
brain-computer interface paradigms intended to restore communication to patients with
disorders of consciousness.
In Experiment 1, imagery of a range of bimanual sequences of actions (“complex
imagery”) resulted in sensorimotor rhythms that were classified from rest with similar
accuracy as imagery of the simple hand squeezes typically used with sensorimotor
rhythm-based brain-computer interfaces. There was a group trend that the complex
actions were classified with higher accuracy than simple hand squeezes, although this
result did not reach statistical significance (p=.068). Furthermore, there was an advantage
for the complex actions in that the sensorimotor rhythms for these actions were classified
from rest for a longer period than the simple actions. More participants also produced
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statistically reliable sensorimotor rhythms for at least one of the complex actions than for
at least one of the simple actions. Overall, the findings of Experiment 1 align with the
prediction that there would be an enhancement of the sensorimotor rhythm for complex
imagery (Holper & Wolf, 2011; Kuhtz-Buschbeck et al., 2003; Roosink & Zijdewind,
2010). In other words, imagined actions involving more than one body part and
sequences of actions (complex motor imagery) may improve the detection of covert
command following in future clinical work and do not necessarily result in less robust
brain responses than conventional motor imagery.
Another interesting finding from Experiment 1 was the between- and within-subject
variability for the various imagined actions. Nearly half of the sample produced a robust
sensorimotor rhythm for at least one of the complex imagined actions, while less than
25% of the sample produced a robust sensorimotor rhythm for at least one of the simple
imagined actions (Table 4). The latter observation is well-illustrated anecdotally by the
classification results of two guitarists who participated in Experiment 1 (Figure 2). The
guitarists imagined performing six different actions throughout their participation in this
study, but both participants generated robust and sustained sensorimotor rhythms only
when they imagined playing the guitar (defined as a complex action in this work). There
was likely no advantage for the complex imagery at the group-level because most
participants, like the guitarists, only produced significant responses for one or two of the
complex imagined actions, rather than for all three of these actions. Accordingly,
complex imagery catered to an individual’s prior experience may enhance the neural
correlates of imagined movement in some cases.
Experienced athletes and musicians were recruited for Experiments 2 and 3 to directly
examine the influence of experience on the neural correlates of motor imagery.
Somewhat surprisingly, there was no advantage for any of the imagined actions for any
group in Experiment 2, regardless of their familiarity with the imagined actions (e.g.,
pianists imagining playing piano, etc.). Compared to novices, experienced athletes and
musicians differentially activate fewer regions of the brain when imagining actions
involving the sport or instrument with which both groups have familiarity (Fourkas et al.,
2008; Lotze et al., 2003; Olsson et al., 2008; Wei & Luo, 2010). Although expert brain

57

responses to familiar imagery are typically consistent within and across individuals
(Langheim, Callicot, Mattay, Duyn, & Weinberger, 2002), these responses did not result
in an enhancement of the sensorimotor rhythm in Experiment 2. Interestingly, however,
there was an advantage for the classification of sensorimotor rhythms generated for
specific, familiar actions (performance of two musical pieces) in Experiment 3.
Classification accuracy was higher and robust for a longer period when the experienced
pianists imagined playing a complex musical piece. Moreover, the imagery of particular
musical pieces in Experiment 3 was associated with the largest and most sustained eventrelated desynchronizations of all the imagery conditions in this chapter (compare Figures
1, 3, and 4). Finally, classification accuracy was higher when pianists imagined playing
the complex musical piece in Experiment 3 than when the same pianists imagined
playing a musical piece of their choice in Experiment 2. It thus seems that imagery of a
well-specified, complex, and familiar action leads to an advantage in sensorimotor
rhythm detection.
Several factors likely contributed to the finding that the specific, complex, and familiar
imagery from Experiment 3 resulted in the most robust sensorimotor rhythms of this
chapter. Firstly, there was some variability between the two experiments involving
imagined musical performance. In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to simply
imagine playing the piano with both hands, rather than to imagine playing particular
musical pieces as in Experiment 3. This variability likely resulted in less consistent and
less robust brain responses over trials and between individuals, regardless of their
familiarity with the piano. Notably, it is unlikely that the specificity of the instructions
alone underlies the advantage of the Experiment 3 imagery, given that all the other
imagery tasks in this work also involved specific instructions (e.g., imagine squeezing
your right hand, etc.). As an additional consideration, playing the piano involves
temporally and spatially complex movements (Zatorre, Chen, & Penhune, 2007).
Analogous finger-sequencing actions that do not require musical training are also
associated with more robust brain responses than less temporally and spatially complex
hand actions (Bengtsson, Ehrsson, Forssberg, & Ullén, 2004). It is accordingly possible
that piano performance imagery was more conducive to an enhanced sensorimotor
rhythm than the other imagined actions in this chapter. Although the imagery from
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Experiment 3 is not appropriate for non-musicians, imagery involving music has been
investigated in several previous brain-computer interface paradigms, including paradigms
based upon the sensorimotor rhythm (e.g., Curran et al., 2004; Power, Kushki, & Chau,
2011; Schaefer, Farquhar, Blokland, Sadakata, & Desain, 2011). Indeed, the sensorimotor
system supports music perception and performance, and musicians and non-musicians
alike differentially activate the supplementary motor area and other premotor cortical
areas when listening to complex rhythms and imagining familiar melodies (for a review,
see Zatorre et al., 2007). As a final possibility, imagery of actions that target other
sensory modalities may further enhance the sensorimotor rhythm. An example of such
imagery is imagining using a tool while imagining the noises that the tool makes (Felton,
Wilson, Williams, & Garell, 2007; Wilson, Felton, Garell, Schalk, & Williams, 2006).
Although the kinaesthetic (as opposed to visual) aspects of motor imagery correlate with
sensorimotor rhythm magnitude (Neuper, Scherer, Reiner, & Pfurtscheller, 2005), a
richer sensory representation of an imagined action may confer advantages in
sensorimotor rhythm detection.
Altogether, this chapter provides three important findings regarding the roles of action
familiarity and complexity in the EEG correlates of imagined movement. Firstly, imagery
of complex, bimanual actions correlates with more robust brain responses in some cases,
as anecdotally illustrated in Figure 2. Importantly, these modified imagery tasks do not
necessarily impair performance compared to the hand-squeeze imagery typically used
with sensorimotor rhythm-based brain-computer interfaces. Secondly, a familiar action
may not always correlate with a more robust sensorimotor rhythm than other actions, but,
thirdly and lastly, an action that is familiar, sufficiently complex, and well specified is
likely to correlate with a more robust sensorimotor rhythm. Indeed, participants need
prior experience with an action to reliably perform motor imagery of that action (Olsson
& Nyberg, 2010). Similarly, brain responses to motor imagery are enhanced following
overt practice of novel actions (Baeck et al., 2012; Lacourse, Orr, Cramer, & Cohen,
2005). For these reasons, it is worthwhile to select an imagery task based on a person’s
skills and interests, regardless of the person’s level of expertise with that action. Most
importantly, the subtle but important changes in task instructions proposed here may
provide benefits to those individuals who are unable to control a conventional
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sensorimotor rhythm-based brain-computer interface (e.g., Figure 2), given the
substantial variability between and within participants in previous work (Hammer et al.,
2011; Vidaurre & Blankertz, 2010).
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Chapter 3

3

Multiple tasks and neuroimaging modalities increase
the likelihood of detecting covert awareness in patients
with disorders of consciousness

A version of this chapter has been published elsewhere and is reproduced here with
permission from R. M. Gibson from the original open-source publication cited below,
according to the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY),
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.
Gibson, R. M., Fernández-Espejo, D., Gonzalez-Lara, L., Owen, A. M., & Cruse, D.
(2014). Multiple tasks and neuroimaging modalities increase the likelihood of detecting
covert awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness. Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, 8, 950. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00950

3.1 Introduction
A key challenge in the differential diagnosis of disorders of consciousness is that these
disorders arise from heterogeneous disruptions to brain structure and function. Patients
may have traumatic or non-traumatic brain injuries, and comorbidity with other disorders
and pathologies is common. Accordingly, there is often high variability between patients
in the specific cognitive abilities that are preserved and disrupted. These differences are
difficult to quantify because most patients cannot overtly respond (Monti, Pickard, &
Owen, 2013; Rodriguez Moreno, Schiff, Giacino, Kalmar, & Hirsch, 2010). Furthermore,
patients with disorders of consciousness are characteristically variable in their observable
behaviour within relatively short time frames. It is not uncommon for a patient to exhibit
different behaviours over the course of one day, although this variability typically
subsides the longer the patient persists in the same conscious state and can be quantified
with rigorous neuropsychological assessment (Cruse, Thibaut, et al., 2013; Giacino et al.,
2002). To complement behavioural assessments, a patient’s cognitive and perceptual
abilities can be evaluated with neuroimaging (Gosseries, Di, Laureys, & Boly, 2014;
Owen, 2013; Stender et al., 2014). Unfortunately, however, some patients are ineligible
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for certain assessments. For example, metallic implants may be incompatible with MRI,
and craniotomies can result in highly abnormal EEG recordings (Lee et al., 2010). For
these reasons, it is critical to utilize multiple assessment techniques (e.g., behaviour,
fMRI, EEG, etc.) with a range of cognitive and sensory tasks to obtain an accurate
representation of a patient’s abilities.
As previously discussed, the most widely adopted fMRI-based technique to assess covert
cognition and awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness involves the neural
correlates of mental imagery. Specifically, fMRI-based assessments often use both a
motor imagery task (“imagine playing tennis”) and a spatial navigation imagery task
(“imagine visiting all the rooms in your house”; Owen et al., 2006). These tasks engage
distinct mental processes and are associated with similarly distinct brain responses.
Specifically, the motor imagery task requires the participant to imagine swinging a tennis
racket, while the spatial navigation task requires the participant to visualize the layout
and contents of his or her home. Consequently, the motor task is associated with
activation of the supplementary motor area, while the spatial navigation task is associated
with activation of the parahippocampal gyrus, the posterior parietal cortex, and the lateral
premotor cortex. These regions of interest have been confirmed in several validation
studies with healthy volunteers (Boly et al., 2007; Fernández-Espejo, Norton, & Owen,
2014; Gabriel et al., 2015; Naci, Cusack, Jia, & Owen, 2013; Owen & Coleman, 2007).
In patient assessments, the reliability of the patient’s brain response is determined by the
patient’s ability to sustain spatially appropriate activation throughout repeated, 30-second
blocks of trials (Boly et al., 2007; Fernández-Espejo et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2010;
Owen et al., 2006). Notably, this prolonged maintenance of a mental representation is the
hallmark evidence for conscious processing in this paradigm (Dehaene & Naccache,
2001; Naccache, 2006).
EEG-based assessments of covert command following for patients with disorders of
consciousness primarily rely upon motor imagery. The most successful EEG-based
adaptations employ motor imagery conventionally used with brain-computer interfaces
(“imagine squeezing your right hand into a fist”; Cruse et al., 2011). The neural
correlates of this task are reliable increases and decreases in EEG spectral power
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(Vaughan et al., 2006). Appropriate spectral changes are maximal over topographically
appropriate areas of the motor cortex (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann,
2001; Pfurtscheller, Neuper, Brunner, & Lopes da Silva, 2005; Yuan, Perdoni, Yang, &
He, 2011). For imagined squeezes of the right hand, appropriate responses are thus
maximal over the left premotor cortex. Time-frequency analyses are typically employed
to quantify power changes in the mu and beta frequency bands, which are classically
defined as 7 to 12 Hz and 13 to 30 Hz, respectively (Neuper & Pfurtscheller, 2001;
Pfurtscheller & Neuper, 1997). In patient assessments, permutation testing is
recommended to determine the reliability of these responses (Billinger et al., 2013;
Cruse, Chennu, et al., 2013; Goldfine et al., 2013; Noirhomme et al., 2014).
Although the EEG correlates of imagined hand squeezes are well documented, some
healthy volunteers do not reliably exhibit these neural responses. In brain-computer
interface applications, this phenomenon is known as brain-computer interface illiteracy,
and it is estimated to account for about 10 to 30% of healthy volunteers who do not
exhibit reliable EEG responses during conventional motor imagery (Hammer et al., 2011;
Vidaurre & Blankertz, 2010). About 15% of patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative
State reliably regulate their brain responses to command (Kondziella, Friberg, Frokjaer,
Fabricius, & Møller, 2016). Given this small portion of eligible patients, a desirable
improvement in EEG-based assessments of covert command following is a reduction in
the likelihood of brain-computer interface illiteracy. Accordingly, the patients in this
chapter were also asked to perform motor imagery of an action identified as familiar to
them by their caregivers. This task was motivated by the results of previous work with
non-brain-injured volunteers, including those described in Chapter 2 (Curran et al., 2004;
Curran & Stokes, 2003; Gibson, Chennu, Owen, & Cruse, 2014; Scherer et al., 2015).
Briefly, experienced athletes and musicians produce more focused and reliable patterns of
brain activation when they imagine actions involving the sport or instrument with which
they have experience (Lotze, Scheler, Tan, Braun, & Birbaumer, 2003; Wei & Luo,
2010). It was accordingly expected that familiar imagery would result in more robust
brain responses from patients and thus reduce the likelihood that patients with the ability
to covertly follow commands would not be identified in the EEG-based assessment.
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When a familiar action could not be identified, patients were asked to imagine dialling on
a telephone. This action was selected because motor imagery of finger sequencing actions
correlates with robust responses from cortical motor areas and enhanced motor evoked
potentials relative to simpler hand actions (Bengtsson, Ehrsson, Forssberg, & Ullén,
2004; Roosink & Zijdewind, 2010). The EEG correlates of familiar motor imagery were
quantified and evaluated in the same way as the EEG correlates of conventional motor
imagery.
In this chapter, a small group of patients with disorders of consciousness underwent
neuropsychological evaluations and fMRI- and EEG-based assessments of covert
command following. Behavioural assessments were performed using the Coma Recovery
Scale-Revised (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). In the fMRI assesment, patients were asked to
perform the motor imagery and spatial navigation imagery tasks previously discussed
(Boly et al., 2007; Owen et al., 2006). In the EEG assesment, patients were asked to
imagine squeezing their right-hand (conventional motor imagery; Cruse et al., 2011) and
an action with which they had experience prior to their brain injury (familiar motor
imagery). In light of the findings of Chapter 2, it was expected that familiar motor
imagery would result in more reliable EEG responses than conventional motor imagery
(Gibson et al., 2014). Furthermore, it was predicted that these distinct neural correlates of
covert command following would provide corroborative evidence for each patient’s
residual abilities.

3.2 Materials and methods
3.2.1

Participants

An initial convenience sample of 14 patients with acquired brain injuries and disorders of
consciousness diagnoses ranging from the Vegetative State to the Minimally Conscious
State Plus were recruited for the EEG and fMRI tasks. Substitute decision makers
provided written, informed consent for the patients. Ethical approval was obtained from
Western University’s Health Sciences Research Ethics Board. Three patients were
excluded from the sample because they were ineligible for the fMRI assessment; two
patients were excluded because they had craniotomies that resulted in poor quality EEG
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data (Lee et al., 2010); and three other patients were excluded due to excessive
movement artefacts. The remaining sample of six patients comprised three patients in a
Vegetative State and three patients in a Minimally Conscious State. Five patients
(Patients 2-6) completed the fMRI and EEG experimental procedures in the same week
with one to three days between sessions, and one patient (Patient 1) completed the fMRI
experimental procedure seven months prior to the EEG experimental procedure. In the
latter case (Patient 1), the patient’s ability to follow commands in neuroimaging-based
assessments has been previously documented using the same fMRI mental imagery
described here (Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013), an fMRI-based attentional paradigm
(Naci & Owen, 2013), and an EEG attempted movement paradigm (Cruse et al., 2012).
Demographic and clinical data for the final sample of patients is included in Table 5.
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Table 5. Demographic and clinical data for the patients discussed in Chapter 3.
Sex/
ID Age
(years)
1

M/38

Interval
since
Ictus
(years)
13
(fMRI)
13.6
(EEG)

2

F/20

6

CRS-R Subscale Scoresa
Aetiology

Traumatic

Vegetative
Traumatic brain
State
injury secondary to
a motor vehicle
collision

M/27

4

4

F/46

20

1

2

1

0

2

2

1

2

1

0

2

Minimally
3
Anoxic brain injury Conscious State
secondary to
Plusb
cardiac arrest

3

2

2

0

3

Minimally
2
Conscious State
Minus

3

2

1

0

2

Vegetative
State

1

0

2

1

0

2

Vegetative
Anoxic brain injury State
secondary to
cardiac arrest

1

0

2

1

0

1

Non-Traumatic

M/57

4

Non-Traumatic

Non-Traumatic
Diffuse anoxic
brain injury
secondary to
cardiac arrest

6

F/35

2

Vegetative
State

Non-Traumatic

Hypoxic brain
injury due to neardrowning
5

Aud Vis Mot Oro Com Aro
1

Undiagnosed
progressive
neuromuscular
deterioration
3

Diagnosis

Non-Traumatic

Notes. fMRI=functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; EEG=electroencephalography; CRSR=Coma Recovery Scaled-Revised; Aud=auditory; Vis=visual; Mot=motor;
Oro=oromotor/verbal; Com=communication; Aro=arousal; M=male; F=female.
a

Highest CRS-R score recorded by the research team until the time of assessment. For Patients
2-6, this period was three to nine months (see text for details). For Patient 1, this period was 24
months (21 evaluations).
b

Patient 3 generated reproducible movements to verbal commands on the auditory sub-scale of
the CRS-R during each evaluation.
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3.2.2

Imagery tasks

During the fMRI testing sessions, patients were asked to perform alternating sessions of
repeated rest-imagery cycles. Each period of imagery or rest lasted for 30 seconds, and
each patient completed five cycles for both imagery tasks. In the motor imagery task,
participants were instructed to imagine swinging their right arm to firmly hit a tennis ball,
as if competing in a tennis match. In the spatial navigation task, the patients were
instructed to imagine moving from room to room in their homes whilst visualising all the
objects they would encounter. The experimental procedure has been reported in previous
work (Boly et al., 2007; Fernández-Espejo et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2010; Owen et al.,
2006).
For the EEG task, the procedure was similar to that reported in (Cruse et al., 2012;
Gibson et al., 2014). Specifically, every trial began with one of three instructions:
‘Imagine squeezing your right hand’, ‘Imagine dialling 9-1-1’ (or a custom action,
detailed in Table 6), and ‘Now, please just relax’. All instructions were 3 seconds in
length and were followed by 2 to 5 seconds of silence. The silent interval was randomly
selected from a uniform distribution on each trial, and the instructions were presented by
earphone. The task was completed in blocks of 48 trials (16 trials per instruction)
presented in a pseudorandom order such that no more than three instructions of the same
type were consecutively presented. Each patient completed four or five blocks during the
assessment, for a total of 192 (four blocks) or 240 (five blocks) trials, with short breaks
between each block.
Table 6. Familiar motor imagery tasks for the patients discussed in Chapter 3.
Patient ID

Familiar Imagery Task

1

Make a tennis serve

2

Dial 9-1-1

3

Lift a weight

4

Play a scale on the piano

5

Kick a soccer ball

6

Dial 9-1-1
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3.2.3

fMRI data acquisition and analysis

fMRI data were acquired in a 3 Tesla Siemens scanner (Magnetom Trio Tim, Siemens,
Germany) with a Siemens 32-channel head-coil (Patients 2, 3, and 6) or a Siemens 12channel head-coil (Patients 1, 4, and 5) at the Centre for Functional and Metabolic
Mapping (Robarts Research Institute, Western University, Canada). Head-coils were
chosen for patient comfort. The MRI protocol included a single session of 165 volumes
of 36 axial slices each covering the whole brain using echo-planar images (repetition
time=2,000 ms, echo time=30 ms, matrix size=70×70, slice thickness=3 mm, in-plane
resolution=3×3 mm, flip angle=78°). High-resolution T1-weighted three-dimensional
magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo images were acquired in the same session
(repetition time=2,300 ms, echo time=2.98 ms, inversion time=900, matrix
size=256×240, voxel size=1 mm3, flip angle=9°). The task instructions and cues were
presented using E-Prime® 2.0 running on Windows XP and an MRI-compatible highquality digital sound system incorporating noise-attenuating headphones (Silent Scan™,
Avotec Inc.).
The fMRI data were pre-processed and analysed using SPM8
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Data were first manually reoriented into the anterior
commissure/posterior commissure plane. Spatial pre-processing included: realignment to
correct for motion; co-registration between the structural and functional data sets; and
smoothing with an 8-mm full width at half maximum Gaussian kernel. Single-subject
fixed-effect analyses were then performed for each patient. The analysis was based on the
general linear model using the canonical hemodynamic response function (Friston et al.,
1995). Each scan was modelled as mental imagery (i.e., motor imagery or spatial
navigation) or rest. Movement parameters calculated from the realignment step were also
included as covariates of non-interest. Additionally, repetition times with levels of
motion above 2 mm and 0.035 radians were discarded. High-pass filtering using a cut-off
period of 128 seconds was implemented to remove slow-signal drifts from the time
series. Linear contrasts were used to obtain subject-specific estimates of the effects of
interest.
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In healthy volunteers, spatial navigation imagery is typically associated with strong and
reliable activity in the parahippocampal gyrus, the posterior parietal cortex, and the
lateral premotor cortex, while tennis imagery elicits activity in the supplementary motor
area (Boly et al., 2007; Fernández-Espejo et al., 2014). For reference, single-subject
activation in a prior study of 14 healthy young adults is depicted in Figure 5 (FernándezEspejo et al., 2014). In the current study involving patients with disorders of
consciousness, a voxel level, family-wise error, whole-brain statistical threshold of
p<0.05 was used. Given the strong anatomical a priori hypotheses, however, the
statistical threshold was reduced to an uncorrected p<0.001 when activation was not
detected at the more conservative threshold (Fernández-Espejo et al., 2010; Friston,
Holmes, Poline, Price, & Frith, 1996).

Figure 5. Activation from healthy young adults during spatial navigation and tennis
motor imagery (Fernández-Espejo et al., 2014).
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The figure depicts single-subject blood-oxygen-level dependent responses from 14
healthy volunteers during mental imagery. The participants completed the same two
mental imagery tasks (spatial navigation and tennis motor imagery) as in the current
work. All participants were scanned using the same 3 Tesla Siemens scanner, and their
fMRI data were processed using the same pipeline and analysis procedure as reported in
this chapter. In the figure, the region of interest showing highest consistency across
scanning sessions in the imagery versus rest contrast is displayed with a family-wise
error-corrected statistical threshold of p<0.05. No scaling for the inset statistical maps
was provided in the original publication and is accordingly not included in this thesis. All
participants aside from C03, C08, C10, and C12 reliably activated the supplementary
motor area for tennis imagery. Participants C03 and C10 reliably activated other
anatomically appropriate areas for tennis imagery (dorsal premotor cortex and inferior
parietal lobule), while Participants C08 and C12 failed to show any appropriate activation
for tennis imagery. For spatial navigation, the following regions were reliably activated:
occipito-parietal junction (C01, C07 C14); parahippocampal cortex (C02, C06, C13);
dorsal premotor cortex (C03, C04, C08); retrosplenial cortex (C05, C11); and precuneus
(C09, C10, C12). This image is reproduced in a slightly modified version with the
permission of D. Fernández-Espejo from the original open-source publication
(Fernández-Espejo et al., 2014).

3.2.4

EEG data acquisition and analysis

The EEG acquisition and pre-processing protocol was the same as that reported in
Chapter 2 (Gibson et al., 2014). Briefly, the EEG data were recorded using the g.Gamma
active electrode system with a four-channel montage housed in an electrode cap (g.tec
Medical Engineering GmbH, Austria). The electrodes were placed at sites CP3, FC3,
CP4, and FC4, and the EEG signals were acquired using a g.USBamp amplifier. Stimuli
presentation and physiological data recordings were performed using a Simulink® model
in Matlab (Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA). Online, the EEG data were filtered from 0.5 to
60 Hz with a 60 Hz notch filter. The recordings were referenced to the right earlobe with
a forehead (Fpz) ground. The data were sampled at 600 Hz with impedances below 5 kΩ
at the beginning of the EEG recording.
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Offline data processing was conducted with EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The
EEG data were down-sampled to 100 Hz, filtered between 0.5 and 40 Hz, and segmented
into 5-s epochs time-locked to the onset of the auditory cue. Trials containing
physiological artefacts were identified by visual inspection and removed. After artefact
rejection, the median number of trials included in each imagery and rest condition per
patient was: 43 for the hand squeeze (range=29−57); 45 for the custom action
(range=32−57); and 44 for rest (range=27−58). Finally, the EEG data were re-referenced
offline to form two bipolar channels (FC3−CP3, FC4−CP4) that are subsequently
identified as C3’ and C4’, respectively.
The EEG data were analysed from 7 to 30 Hz using the same spectral analysis procedure
reported in previous work and Chapter 2 (Cruse et al., 2012; Gibson et al., 2014). In
Figure 6, patterns of spectral changes from a sample of six healthy young adults using the
same task and analysis procedure are presented (Cruse et al., 2012). For each time-point
at C3’ and C4’, spectral power estimates were calculated using a 1-second Hanning
window time-frequency transformation via the ‘ft_freqstatistics’ function from the opensource Matlab toolbox, FieldTrip (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). The
time-frequency data at both electrodes were then compared between motor imagery and
rest using cluster-based permutation testing (Cruse et al., 2012; Gibson et al., 2014;
Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). For the cluster-based testing, the time-frequency data for
each imagery condition and rest were log-transformed and then compared at each data
point using paired-samples t tests. All significant data points (p<0.025) were then
arranged into clusters based on their temporal and spectral proximity to each other, and
the t values were summed for each cluster. A Monte Carlo randomization test that
controlled for family-wise error was used to determine the significance value for each
cluster. In the randomization test, the condition labels were permuted, and the clustering
procedure was repeated 1,000 times. The clusters from these 1,000 repetitions were used
to form a distribution, and this distribution was then used to test the null hypothesis that
the original summed t value occurred by chance.
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Figure 6. EEG responses from healthy young adults during conventional motor imagery
(Cruse et al., 2012).
The figure depicts event-related desynchronizations and event-related synchronizations
over left and right motor cortex in a sample of six healthy young adults. The participants
completed the same conventional EEG motor imagery task as in the current work (right
hand motor imagery) and an additional task of left hand motor imagery, as indicated. The
ranges of log power values that are plotted in each spectrogram are indicated in
parentheses at the top of each plot. This figure is reproduced with the permission of D.
Cruse from the original open-source publication (Cruse et al., 2012).

3.3 Results
Figure 7 provides a summary of the results from the behavioural, EEG, and fMRI
assessments for each patient. Patient 1 was diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State from
21 evaluations with the Coma Recovery Scale conducted in the 24 months prior to the
fMRI/EEG assessments (highest score=7, range=4−7). In the fMRI study, this patient
produced reliable and appropriate activation in both the spatial navigation and motor
imagery tasks (occipito-parietal junction and supplementary motor area respectively,
family-wise error p<0.05). In the EEG task, Patient 1 also produced a contralateral eventrelated desynchronization in the mu frequency band (9−13 Hz) for the conventional
imagery (p=0.018). Patient 2’s highest score on the Coma Recovery Scale was 8 (range:
4−8, period: five assessments in four months), leading to a diagnosis of Vegetative State.
Patient 2 did not produce reliable activation in the fMRI tasks or reliable spectral changes
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in the EEG tasks. Patient 3 scored in the Minimally Conscious State Plus range (highest
score=13, range=11−13, period: four assessments in four months). This patient did not
produce significant activation during the fMRI tasks. However, he did produce
appropriate, reliable spectral changes during the conventional EEG motor imagery task
(contralateral event-related desynchronization, 7−13 Hz, p=0.004). Patient 4 was
diagnosed as being in a Minimally Conscious State Minus (highest score=10,
range=8−10, period: three assessments in nine months). Although this patient showed no
activation at the conservative threshold (family-wise error p<0.05), she produced
reliable, appropriate activation during the fMRI spatial navigation task in the bilateral
occipito-parietal junction (uncorrected p<0.001). However, Patient 4 did not produce
reliable, appropriate activation for the fMRI motor imagery task, or the EEG motor
imagery tasks. Patient 5 scored in the Vegetative State range (highest score=6,
range=3−6, period: four assessments in five months) and did not produce reliable
responses for any of the fMRI or EEG assessments. Finally, Patient 6 also scored in the
Vegetative State range (highest score=5, range=3−5, period: four assessments in three
months). As with Patient 4, reliable, appropriate activation was detected during the
spatial navigation fMRI task (right parahippocampal gyrus and right premotor cortex,
family-wise error p<0.05). However, this patient did not produce reliable activation for
the fMRI motor imagery task, or the EEG motor imagery tasks.
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Figure 7. Summary of the patient outcomes in Chapter 3.
CRS-R=Coma Recovery Scale-Revised; fMRI=functional magnetic resonance imaging;
EEG=electroencephalography; VS=Vegetative State; MCS=Minimally Conscious State;
OPJ=occipito-parietal junction; SMA=supplementary motor area; PMC=premotor cortex;
PHG=parahippocampal gyrus; ERD=event-related desynchronization. Significant taskrelated fMRI activation is labelled by region. Scales depicting the statistical maps (t
values) are inset. Results are shown at uncorrected p<0.001 and rendered on each
patient’s T1 MRI image. Spectrograms of the log ratio differences in EEG power
between conventional motor imagery and rest are shown for the left (contralateral)
hemisphere. The vertical axis depicts the frequency of the EEG signal (7−30 Hz), and the
horizontal axis depicts time (seconds) relative to instruction onset. The inset colour scale
depicts the log ratio power values of the z-axis with significant clusters outlined in black
(Patient 1, p=0.018; Patient 3, p=0.004).
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To complement the experimental neuroimaging-based assessments, clinical radiologists
(authors BYK and DHL in the published version of this chapter) provided assessments of
the available clinical structural images of each patient’s brain. The radiologists were
blinded to all aspects of the patient’s identities, diagnoses, and experimental outcomes.
The time of the clinical assessments varied for each patient, but all scans had been
conducted near the time the patients were admitted following their brain injuries for
Patients 1 and 5. More recent clinical assessments were available for the remaining
patients, although no clinical structural brain images were available for Patient 4. The
radiological reports are summarized in Table 7. The only finding involving a brain region
of interest in these assessments was low signal change in the bilateral pre- and postcentral gyri of Patient 6. This area is a region of interest in the fMRI-based motor
imagery task.
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Table 7. Summary of the radiological evaluations of available clinical structural brain
images for the patients in Chapter 3.
Patient ID

Radiological Findings

1

Moderately severe contralateral shift to the midline
Effaced subarachnoid space and convexity sulci

2

Generalised brain edema
Decreased grey and white matter differentiation
No sign of hematomas or contusions

3

Diffuse progressive atrophic change
Volume loss with severe ventricular dilation

4

Clinical images unavailable for assessment

5

Areas of signal change within the caudate nuclei and putamen
Some attenuation of the distal arterial branches
No vascular irregularity in the proximal vessels

6

Decreased signal and restricted diffusion in cerebral white matter
Low signal within white matter of the pre- and post-central gyri bilaterally
No evidence of bleed

In summary, six patients were evaluated using a standard clinical behavioural assessment,
the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005), two fMRI-based imagery
tasks (Boly et al., 2007; Owen et al., 2006), and two EEG-based motor imagery tasks
(Cruse et al., 2011; Gibson et al., 2014). Patient 1 (Vegetative State) was unable to
follow commands behaviourally, but exhibited covert command following in both the
fMRI- and EEG-based tasks. Two patients (Patient 4 [Minimally Conscious State Minus]
and Patient 6 [Vegetative State]) also showed no signs of behavioural command
following, but exhibited covert command following in the spatial navigation fMRI task.
Patient 3 (Minimally Conscious State Plus) followed commands behaviourally and
covertly in the conventional motor imagery EEG task. Finally, Patients 2 and 5 (both
Vegetative State) did not follow commands in either the behavioural, fMRI-, or EEGbased assessments.
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3.4 Discussion and conclusions
Functional neuroimaging methods for the detection of covert command following can
improve diagnostic and prognostic accuracy in disorders of consciousness (Owen, 2013).
Due to the heterogeneity of aetiology and pathology in this patient group, however,
multiple imaging techniques and functional tasks are necessary to accurately identify a
covert ability to follow commands. In this chapter, three patients who were unable to
follow commands with their behaviour exhibited appropriate and statistically reliable
signs of covert command following. Furthermore, two of these patients (Patients 1 and 6)
were repeatedly diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State. These findings thus add to the
growing body of evidence that some patients with severe brain injuries have cognitive
abilities that are not necessarily evident from their external behaviour (Kondziella et al.,
2016; Owen, 2013).
One patient diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State (Patient 1) exhibited covert
command following during both the fMRI- and EEG-based motor imagery tasks—i.e.,
“imagine playing tennis” in the fMRI-based assessment, and “imagine squeezing your
right-hand” in the EEG-based assessment. The covert awareness of this patient has been
previously reported in other fMRI and EEG tasks (Cruse et al., 2012; Fernández-Espejo
& Owen, 2013; Naci & Owen, 2013). Indeed, across all published studies, this patient
demonstrated his covert awareness with three separate fMRI tasks and two EEG tasks,
thus providing perhaps unequivocal evidence that he was aware. Although internally
consistent, these findings conflict with the outcomes of repeated clinical evaluations
throughout the 12 years in which the patient survived following his injury.
Two patients (Patient 4 [Minimally Conscious State Minus] and Patient 6 [Vegetative
State]) only followed commands during the spatial navigation fMRI imagery task. The
absence of statistically reliable results in the EEG tasks for these patients is consistent
with the absence of reliable activation during the fMRI ‘tennis’ task in the same patients,
as both tasks require brain responses that correlate with motor imagery. From their
radiological findings (Table 7), Patient 6 (Vegetative State) presented with specific
damage to motor areas as evident from scattered areas of low fluid attenuation inversion
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recovery signal and high white matter signal in the posterior precentral gyrus. Patient 1,
on the other hand—also Vegetative State but, unlike Patient 6, capable of successful
performance in the motor imagery tasks—showed no apparent damage to motor areas
bilaterally. Together, these findings suggest that the absence of reliable motor imagery
responses may be a result of a specific impairment in motor planning, or at least in the
detectability of EEG/fMRI responses from brain areas that correlate with motor function.
Patient 4 (Minimally Conscious State Minus) also followed commands only during
spatial navigation. Unlike Patient 6, however, Patient 4 did not present with any damage
to cortical motor areas. Notably, this patient was tested about twenty years after her
injury. It is possible that functional reorganization in motor areas occurred in this time,
although it is unclear why such functional reorganization would have occurred in brain
areas that correlate with motor imagery and not spatial navigation imagery. Nevertheless,
the results of Patients 4 and 6 together emphasize the importance of a battery of
assessments to accurately characterise a given patient’s abilities. Indeed, if motor
imagery were the only option provided to Patients 4 and 6, their covert awareness may
have never been elucidated.
Patient 3 (Minimally Conscious State Plus) could follow simple behavioural commands
and exhibited covert command following in the EEG conventional motor imagery task.
However, this patient did not yield positive results in either of the fMRI-based
assessments. While the presence of awareness was never in question for this patient due
to his behavioural diagnosis of Minimally Conscious State Plus, his divergent fMRI and
EEG results again highlight the importance of multiple modalities and tasks in the
assessment of patients with disorders of consciousness. Indeed, the fMRI and EEG
assessments were performed on different days and at various times of the day, thereby
increasing the patient’s opportunities to demonstrate his command following capacities.
Moreover, varying levels of arousal and awareness are defining traits of patients in a
Minimally Conscious State (Giacino et al., 2002) and may have contributed to the
divergence between behaviour and fMRI in this case.
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Patients 2 and 5 (both Vegetative State) did not demonstrate command following in any
of the fMRI- or EEG-based assessments. These results mirror the outcomes of their
behavioural evaluations. Indeed, patients in a Vegetative State completely lack voluntary
behaviour, and very few patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State possess covert
awareness and cognition (Di Perri et al., 2016; Kondziella et al., 2016; Schiff & Fins,
2016). It is accordingly plausible (and quite probable) that the converging results of the
assessments of Patients 2 and 5 accurately represent the abilities of these patients.
Nevertheless, and as has been discussed at length elsewhere, null neuroimaging findings
from patients with disorders of consciousness cannot be interpreted as a lack of
awareness per se (Laureys & Boly, 2007; Owen et al., 2006). Indeed, false negatives may
occur due to fatigue, lack of understanding, or insufficient cognitive resources. In the
absence of self-report, it is difficult to distinguish negative findings that arise from a lack
of ability from those that arise due to an intention not to perform the task. Healthy
volunteers and patients with brain injuries may elect not to engage in a volitional mental
process, and false negatives occur in neuroimaging studies of healthy volunteers,
especially at the single-subject level (e.g., Cruse et al., 2011; Fernández-Espejo et al.,
2014; Naci, Cusack, Jia, & Owen, 2013). Although multiple assessments can provide a
more thorough characterisation of a patient’s abilities, these approaches do not eliminate
the possibility of attribution errors.
This chapter also included an exploratory secondary EEG motor imagery task. All
patients were asked to perform two types of motor imagery during the EEG task: 1)
imagined squeezes of their right-hands, in line with conventional motor imagery EEG
tasks (Cruse et al., 2011, 2012; Pfurtscheller & Neuper, 1997); and 2) imagined familiar
actions that were selected in consultation with their caregivers. Unfortunately, there were
no positive results for any patient during the familiar EEG motor imagery task, even
though two patients demonstrated positive results during the conventional EEG motor
imagery task. One potential explanation for the lower sensitivity of the familiar imagery
in this chapter is that familiar imagery resulted in brain responses that were not detected
with the present EEG acquisition protocol. For example, imagined familiar actions may
have involved memories or emotions to a greater extent than hand squeezes. Kinaesthetic
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motor imagery is associated with more robust EEG correlates of imagined movement
than visual motor imagery (Neuper, Scherer, Reiner, & Pfurtscheller, 2005). Accordingly,
the patients may have engaged in more visual imagery during the familiar task, and
consequently produced brain responses that were not easily detected with the current
experimental set-up. Fortunately, both patients (Patients 1 and 3) who exhibited reliable
EEG responses to conventional motor imagery produced sensorimotor rhythms that are
consistent with previous studies of healthy individuals (Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva,
1999; Pfurtscheller & Neuper, 1997). This finding is reassuring for further investigations
of the EEG correlates of motor imagery in patients with disorders of consciousness.
As a final consideration, attempts have been made to develop an EEG-based assessment
of covert command following using spatial navigation (Cabrera & Dremstrup, 2008;
Curran et al., 2004; Goldfine, Victor, Conte, Bardin, & Schiff, 2011). These attempts
employed an identical imagery task as the fMRI-based equivalent (Boly et al., 2007;
Owen et al., 2006). Notably, spatial navigation imagery was associated with better
classification accuracy than motor imagery in one EEG study of healthy volunteers
(Curran et al., 2004), and modest improvements in classification accuracy were obtained
with optimized machine learning techniques (Cabrera & Dremstrup, 2008). In terms of
electrophysiological correlates, spatial navigation imagery corresponds with enhanced
theta oscillatory activity in the hippocampus and related brain structures in the medial
temporal lobe (Cornwell, Johnson, Holroyd, Carver, & Grillon, 2008; Kahana, Sekuler,
Caplan, Kirschen, & Madsen, 1999; see also Maguire, Frackowiak, & Frith, 1997).
Unfortunately, these signals are not easily detected at the scalp, and no consistent EEGbased correlate of spatial navigation was identified in any of the studies that employed
acquisition protocols suitable for future use at the bedside (Cabrera & Dremstrup, 2008;
Curran et al., 2004; Goldfine et al., 2011). Similarly, the only reported validation of an
EEG-based spatial navigation task involving patients with disorders of consciousness
rendered inconclusive results (Goldfine et al., 2011). Accordingly, an EEG-based
assessment of spatial navigation imagery was not included in this thesis because there is
no reliable EEG correlate of this mental task.
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In summary, covert signs of awareness can improve diagnostic and prognostic accuracy
in patients with disorders of consciousness (Owen, 2008). The current findings
demonstrate that a range of tasks and neuroimaging modalities are required to accurately
characterise residual cognition in patients with disorders of consciousness. Indeed, two
patients failed to follow commands in motor imagery tasks, but produced appropriate
activation in a spatial navigation task. In these cases, the patients’ specific patterns of
brain damage may have disproportionately impaired some cognitive abilities, or made
their neural markers more difficult to detect. An effective battery of assessments for
patients with disorders of consciousness should therefore include a variety of tasks that
probe a range of cognitive abilities supported by spatially-distinct brain regions and
indexed by multiple neural signatures, including EEG oscillations, event-related
potentials, and fMRI-detected hemodynamic responses. Indeed, five patients were
excluded from the current study because they did not qualify for evaluations with one of
the two neuroimaging techniques. While no neuroimaging-based task is likely to be
100% sensitive, the implementation of a battery of assessments alongside standardized
behavioural evaluations will go a long way to address the currently low rate of diagnostic
accuracy for patients with disorders of consciousness (Childs, Mercer, & Childs, 1993;
Schnakers et al., 2009).
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Chapter 4

4

Somatosensory attention identifies both overt and
covert awareness in disorders of consciousness

A version of this chapter has been published elsewhere (citation below) and is reproduced
here with permission from the publisher, John Wiley and Sons (Appendix B).
Gibson, R. M., Chennu, S., Fernández-Espejo, D., Naci, L., Owen, A. M., & Cruse, D.
(2016). Somatosensory attention identifies both overt and covert awareness in disorders
of consciousness. Annals of Neurology, 80(3), 412–423.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ana.24726

4.1 Introduction
To facilitate the differential diagnosis of disorders of consciousness, researchers have
developed assessments of brain function to describe a patient’s abilities within a
hierarchy of increasingly complex information processing. For example, an fMRI-based
technique was developed to characterise the speech processing abilities of patients with
disorders of consciousness (Coleman et al., 2009). This approach distinguished between
low-level auditory processing, speech-specific perceptual processing, and semantic
processing. While the level of auditory processing had a high correspondence with
subsequent behavioural recovery, it did not provide diagnostic information—i.e., some
patients in a Vegetative State and other patients in a Minimally Conscious State
performed at each level of the hierarchy (Coleman et al., 2009). A similar technique was
developed using EEG, with levels ranging from the discrimination of sound versus
silence to semantic speech perception (Beukema et al., 2016; Cruse et al., 2014). As in
the fMRI approach, however, some patients in a Vegetative State and other patients in a
Minimally Conscious State performed at all levels of the hierarchy (Beukema et al.,
2016). Investigations of attentional processing have rendered similar findings; while
some investigators reported that only patients in a Minimally Conscious State produced
markers of higher-order attentional information processing (Bekinschtein et al., 2009;
Chennu et al., 2013; Faugeras et al., 2012; Lew et al., 2003), others did not (Fischer,
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Luaute, & Morlet, 2010; Kotchoubey et al., 2005; Steppacher et al., 2013). Although
neuroimaging-based assessments of patients with disorders of consciousness can
complement behavioural evaluations, improvements are needed to ensure that a patient’s
abilities are accurately represented when there are discrepancies between behavioural and
neural profiles.
The inconsistent correspondence between diagnosis and the presence or absence of neural
markers of higher-order information processing in previous work may be due to
misdiagnoses of covert command following. Indeed, only one of these investigations
identified patients with covert command following abilities (Chennu et al., 2013). Up to
15% of patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State may have the ability to covertly
follow commands (Kondziella, Friberg, Frokjaer, Fabricius, & Møller, 2016), and it
would be useful to characterise the cognitive abilities of such patients. Additionally, most
previous approaches to cognitive assessments of patients with disorders of consciousness
rely on auditory information (c.f. Monti et al., 2013). While visual stimuli are impractical
given that many patients with disorders of consciousness cannot fixate their eyes, tactile
stimulation is a promising alternative. Tactile stimulation has been successfully used to
facilitate brain-computer interface-based communication with healthy volunteers and
patients with Locked-in Syndrome (Brouwer & van Erp, 2010; Kaufmann, Holz, &
Kübler, 2013; Lugo et al., 2014; Ortner, Prückl, & Guger, 2013; van der Waal, Severens,
Geuze, & Desain, 2012). Some healthy volunteers also report that tactile feedback seems
more natural than visual or auditory feedback in brain-computer interface paradigms
(Chatterjee, Aggarwal, Ramos, Acharya, & Thakor, 2007; Cincotti et al., 2007).
Furthermore, brain-computer interfaces that use tactile stimulation may be more feasible
in activities of daily living because these approaches leave the auditory and visual
systems free for other applications (Maye, Zhang, Wang, Gao, & Engel, 2011; Zhang et
al., 2007).
Many previous assessments of the somatosensory system in patients with disorders of
consciousness pertain to pain perception. A common paradigm involves the application
of noxious electrical stimulation to the patient’s wrist to determine whether the patient
can sense or perceive pain (Boly et al., 2008; Laureys, 2005). Notably, this technique has
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strong prognostic value in that patients who lack cortical responses to somatosensory
stimuli whilst in an acutely comatose state are very unlikely to recover awareness
(Zandbergen, de Haan, Stoutenbeek, Koelman, & Hijdra, 1998). In contrast, the approach
described here involves the administration of non-painful vibrotactile stimulation to a
patient’s wrists and upper back. The prognostic value of this type of stimulation is
currently unknown, and the large-scale clinical studies needed to evaluate prognosis are
beyond the scope of this thesis. Importantly, it is also not appropriate to attribute
awareness per se to brain responses in the absence of self-report. Nevertheless, the tactile
stimulation used in this work can provide caregivers with more insight into the patient’s
probable subjective experience, including whether the patient responds to touch at the
cortical level and exhibits differential cortical responses to changes in touch.
In this chapter, a hierarchical cognitive assessment of attention based on tactile
stimulation is described. Each participant was presented with repetitive vibrotactile
stimulation to the upper back alongside relatively more infrequent vibrotactile stimulation
of the wrists. Stimulation was applied at a high, uniform rate to elicit a marker of sensory
perception called the steady-state evoked potential (Picton, John, Dimitrijevic, & Purcell,
2003; Regan, 1977; Snyder, 1992). Infrequent stimulation was also applied to the wrists
to elicit an event-related potential correlate of attention called the P300 (Comerchero &
Polich, 1999; Picton, 1992; Polich, 2007). Although steady-state responses have not been
extensively studied in this patient population (Chatelle et al., 2012), some patients with
disorders of consciousness can generate P300s (e.g., Faugeras et al., 2011, 2012; Fischer
et al., 2010; Hauger et al., 2015; Schnakers et al., 2008; Steppacher et al., 2013). P300
responses also have similar morphological and topographic characteristics when
generated by somatosensory, auditory, and visual stimuli (Kaufmann et al., 2013; Lugo et
al., 2014; van der Waal et al., 2012; Yamaguchi & Knight, 1991a, 1991b).
The vibrotactile attention task probed selective attention. Specifically, participants were
instructed to selectively attend to the infrequent wrist stimuli by counting vibrations on a
designated target wrist, i.e., their left or right wrist. This manipulation was intended to
elicit changes in the P300 due to top-down, conscious processing (Comerchero & Polich,
1999; Squires, Donchin, Herning, & McCarthy, 1977). If successful, the counting aspect
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of the task could eventually be applied in future communicative applications of the
paradigm (e.g., attend left wrist to answer “yes”, etc.). The selective attention measure
also dissociated between endogenous and exogenous attentional processing in the
patients, and thus provided additional insight into their cognitive abilities (Chennu et al.,
2013; Chennu & Bekinschtein, 2012).
In total, a sample of fourteen patients with severe brain injuries and a group of healthy
volunteers underwent a hierarchical cognitive assessment based on vibrotactile
stimulation and EEG. Importantly, patients were also evaluated using two previously
established fMRI-based assessments of covert command following; one fMRI-based
assessment involved mental imagery (Owen et al., 2006), and the other involved selective
auditory attention (Naci & Owen, 2013). All patients underwent clinical behavioural
assessments with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005). By
identifying patients with the ability to covertly and overtly follow commands, these
additional assessments ensured a more accurate representation of each patient’s residual
cognitive abilities. Furthermore, these repeated assessments provided an opportunity to
test the divergence and convergence of all techniques. It was expected that event-related
potential markers of higher-order attention would be evident in patients with the ability to
follow commands.

4.2 Materials and methods
4.2.1

Participants

Fourteen patients [mean age 41 (range: 19 to 58) years] contributed sufficient data for
inclusion in this investigation. Seven patients were diagnosed as being in a Vegetative
State (Royal College of Physicians Working Group, 2003); four patients were diagnosed
as being in a Minimally Conscious State; two patients were diagnosed as emergent from a
Minimally Conscious State (Giacino et al., 2002); and one patient was diagnosed with
Locked-in Syndrome (Smith & Delargy, 2005). Six patients had sustained traumatic brain
injuries from motor vehicle accidents. The remaining eight patients had sustained nontraumatic brain injuries from different aetiologies including cardiac arrest (3 cases) and
near drowning (1 case). Each patient’s substitute decision maker provided informed,

97

written consent for the patient’s participation in the study. Ethical approval was obtained
from the University of Western Ontario’s Health Sciences Research Ethics Board
(London, Ontario, Canada).
As a scientific control, a sample of fifteen healthy volunteers also participated in the
somatosensory selective attention task. These participants ranged in age from 17 to 23
years (mean age of 18 years). All healthy volunteers provided informed written consent
and received course credit for their participation. The Psychology Research Ethics Board
of the University of Western Ontario (London, Ontario, Canada) provided ethical
approval for the control study. Control studies of the other neuroimaging paradigms have
been reported elsewhere (Boly et al., 2007; Gabriel et al., 2015; Naci, Cusack, Jia, &
Owen, 2013).

4.2.2

Procedure

For each patient, this study comprised participation in three experimental paradigms:
(1) A somatosensory selective attention paradigm using EEG;
(2) An auditory selective attention paradigm using fMRI (Naci et al., 2013; Naci &
Owen, 2013); and
(3) A mental imagery paradigm using fMRI (Bardin et al., 2011; Boly et al., 2007;
Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013; Gibson, Fernández-Espejo, et al., 2014; Monti et
al., 2010; Owen et al., 2006; Stender et al., 2014).
Immediately prior to his or her participation in each experiment, each patient also
underwent a behavioural assessment using the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (Kalmar &
Giacino, 2005). The fMRI data from Patient EMCS2 could not be analysed due to
excessive motion artefacts. However, this patient was included in this investigation
because his ability to follow simple commands and communicate was evident from his
overt behaviour. Similarly, the data for Patient VS7 from one fMRI session (selective
auditory attention, Experiment 2) were discarded due to excessive movement. This
patient was included in the current investigation because useable data were obtained from

98

this patient for the other two experimental paradigms. Details of the Coma Recovery
Scale behavioural outcomes for all patients are available in Appendix D.
All patients completed the two fMRI paradigms within a two-day period. Ten patients
completed the fMRI assessments within two days of their EEG assessments. The other
four patients completed the EEG assessments after the fMRI assessment with the
following delay: 1.5-months (EMCS1); 7.5-months (MCS3); 1-year (VS3); and 3.5-years
(VS7). Only Patient MCS3 demonstrated a clinical status change between her
assessments with EEG and fMRI (Minimally Conscious State Minus to Minimally
Conscious State Plus). Given the aetiology, age, and time post-ictus of those patients with
a year or more between assessments (Appendix D), it is unlikely (although not
impossible) that either of these patients underwent a change in their conscious states
between assessments (Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994a, 1994b; Royal College of
Physicians Working Group, 2003). Indeed, Patients VS3 and VS7 demonstrated overt
behaviour consistent with a Vegetative State at all assessments.

4.2.2.1

Experiment 1: Somatosensory selective attention with EEG

Participants completed a short somatosensory selective attention task as their
electroencephalograms were recorded. One stimulator was affixed to each wrist and the
upper back for a total of three stimulators per participant. Each stimulator administered
non-painful vibrotactile stimuli via a motor housed in a rubberized casing (Ortner et al.,
2013). A similar paradigm has also been evaluated for patients with Locked-in Syndrome
(Lugo et al., 2014). The experiment comprised 14 blocks. Participants were presented
with a series of vibrations alternating among their wrists (10% per wrist) and upper back
(80%). A vibration occurred every 200 ms and lasted for 50 ms. The number of
vibrations presented to each wrist in a block was randomly selected from a uniform
interval of 28 to 32. There was always a minimum of three (maximum=21) upper back
stimuli between wrist vibrations; on average, 49% (standard deviation=13%) of the wrist
stimuli followed exactly three upper back stimuli. Participants were instructed to count
the vibrations only presented to the target wrist. The experimenter touched the patient’s
target wrist after the instruction. The right wrist was always the target wrist for the first
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block and subsequently alternated between the left and right wrists. The healthy
volunteers reported their count at the end of each block; these participants reported the
correct number of vibrations for 12 of 14 blocks on average, and all reports were within
±3 of the true number of targets. One block of trials lasted for approximately one minute.

4.2.2.2

Experiment 2: Auditory selective attention with fMRI

The fMRI selective auditory attention paradigm has been previously described in healthy
individuals (Naci et al., 2013) and patients with disorders of consciousness (Naci &
Owen, 2013). In brief, this task was designed to identify the ability to follow a command
pertaining to selective attention. On each trial, participants were instructed to either count
a target word (“yes” or “no”) presented among pseudorandom distractors (spoken digits
one to nine), or to relax. Each trial had an on/off design of about 22.5 seconds of sound
followed by 10 seconds of silence, and each scan lasted five minutes, including
instructions.

4.2.2.3

Experiment 3: Command following with fMRI

During an fMRI scan, patients were asked to engage in two mental imagery paradigms
(Bardin et al., 2011; Boly et al., 2007; Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013; Gibson,
Fernández-Espejo, et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2010; Owen et al., 2006; Stender et al.,
2014). In the motor imagery task, patients were instructed to imagine swinging their right
arm to hit a tennis ball. In the spatial navigation task, patients were instructed to imagine
moving from room to room in their house whilst visualising all the objects they would
encounter. Instructions were delivered with noise cancellation headphones (Silent
ScanTM, Avotec Inc. for patients scanned in the Trio system, as well as Patient VS6 [first
visit], and Sensimetrics S14 for the patients scanned in the Prisma system, including
Patient VS6 [second visit]). Patients VS1, VS2, VS4, VS5, VS6 (second visit), MCS4,
and EMCS1 completed two sessions of each task, while patients VS3, VS6 (first visit),
VS7, MCS1, MCS2, MCS3, and LIS1 completed only one session due to scanner
availability or suspected patient fatigue. Each task alternated five 30-second blocks of
mental imagery and five 30-second blocks of rest for a total of five minutes per scan.
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4.2.2.4

Replication data

Patients VS4, MCS3, and EMCS1 participated in second assessments with the
somatosensory selective attention task and the Coma Recovery Scale. These assessments
occurred from 2 to 3.5 months following their initial participation. Patient VS6 completed
a second assessment comprising her participation in all three experimental paradigms and
the Coma Recovery Scale 22-months after her initial participation. All four patients
maintained the same clinical status at follow-up (Appendix D).

4.2.3

EEG data acquisition and pre-processing

EEG data were recorded at sites FC1, Fz, FC2, C3, Cz, C4, CP1, CP2, Pz, Oz, PO7, and
PO8 using an electrode cap with the g.Gamma active electrode system (g.tec Medical
Engineering GmbH, Austria). This montage was selected following a previous study
conducted in patients with Locked-in Syndrome (Lugo et al., 2014) and previous work
concerning optimal P300 classification (Krusienski et al., 2006). Data were sampled at
256 Hz and filtered between 0.5 and 30 Hz using a digital Butterworth filter. Stimuli
were presented with the g.VIBROstim box (g.tec Medical Engineering GmbH, Austria)
using a custom Matlab script for Simulink® (Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA). The
recordings were referenced to the right earlobe with a forehead (Fpz) ground with
impedances below 5 kΩ at the beginning of the EEG recording.
Offline data processing was conducted with EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The
data were segmented into 1-second epochs including data from 200 ms prior to stimulus
onset. Linear detrending and baseline correction were applied to each epoch. For artefact
correction, all trials containing data with voltages exceeding ±100 µV were rejected. In a
second step, the kurtosis of the signal across all channels was separately calculated for
each stimulus type, and all trials exceeding 2.5 standard deviations of the mean were
rejected. Final trial numbers are reported in Table 8.
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Table 8. Trials remaining following artefact rejection for Experiment 1 in Chapter 4
Stimulus Type
Mean
(Minimum−Maximum)
Upper Back

Target Wrist

Non-Target
Wrist

Trials Rejected
(%)

Patients
(n=14)

2614
(1591−3246)

313
(188−384)

311
(180−388)

35
(20−59)

Controls
(n=15)

2890
(2718−5026)

345
(327−363)

345
(321−359)

25
(20−32)

Notes. A 2x3 Chi-square goodness of fit test indicated that the minimum number of trials
in each of the three stimulus types did not significantly differ between the controls and
patients at the group level, χ2(2)=0.21, p=0.9.

4.2.4

fMRI data acquisition and pre-processing

The MRI data were acquired in a 3 Tesla Siemens scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany)
with a Siemens 32-channel head-coil at the Centre for Functional and Metabolic Mapping
(Robarts Research Institute, Western University, Canada). The patients were recruited
over 30-months, in which time the 3 Tesla scanner was upgraded. Three patients (VS3,
VS7, and MCS3) were scanned in a Magnetom Trio system. All other patients were
scanned in a Magnetom Prisma system. Functional echo-planar images of 36 slices
covering the whole brain were acquired (repetition time=2,000 ms, echo time=30 ms,
matrix size=420x420, slice thickness=3 mm, in-plane resolution=3×3 mm, flip
angle=78°; for patients VS6 and LIS1 only, matrix size=384x384 and flip angle=75°).
High-resolution T1-weighted three-dimensional images were acquired in the same
session (Trio system: repetition time=2,300 ms, echo time=2.98 ms, inversion time=900
ms, matrix size=256×240, voxel size=1 mm3, flip angle=9°; Prisma system: repetition
time=2,300 ms, echo time=2.32 ms, inversion time=900 ms, matrix size=256x256, flip
angle=8°; for patients VS6 and LIS1 only, matrix size=240x256 and flip angle=9°). Data
from the mental imagery paradigm were pre-processed using SPM8
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), as described in Chapter 3 (Gibson, Fernández-Espejo,

102

et al., 2014). For the selective attention paradigm, the same pre-processing was
performed with the Automatic Analysis software (Cusack et al., 2014).

4.2.5
4.2.5.1

Statistical analyses
Experiment 1: Somatosensory selective attention with EEG

The EEG data were assessed for the presence of a steady-state evoked potential to the
repetitive vibrotactile stimulation. As one vibration occurred every 200 ms, an evoked
response was considered present when the averaged peak of the frequency spectrum of
the data at the stimulation rate (5 Hz) and its first harmonic (10 Hz) was significantly
higher than the background noise (Dobie & Wilson, 1996). A frequency spectrum was
calculated with a discrete Fourier transform over the entire 1-second epoch from the
average of all trials only using data from site Pz (Mouraux et al., 2011; Tobimatsu,
Zhang, & Kato, 1999). An F ratio (alpha=.05; F2,20>=3.49) was computed to compare the
power at 5 and 10 Hz with the average power in the ten adjacent frequency bins (2−4 Hz,
6−9 Hz, and 11−13 Hz; Dobie & Wilson, 1996).
Two analyses of the EEG data were conducted to identify the attention-based eventrelated potentials. For the bottom-up attention effect, responses to wrist (deviant) and
upper back (standard) stimuli were compared. A pseudorandom subset of the standard
stimuli (equal in number to the deviant stimuli) was selected because there were many
more standard than deviant stimuli. For the top-down attention effect, responses to the
target and non-target wrist stimuli were compared. Trial numbers were matched between
the target and non-target trials.
Of note, the event-related potential comparisons in this work employ cognitive
definitions of top-down and bottom-up attention. However, the resultant contrasts differ
from the classic event-related potential contrasts for bottom-up and top-down attention,
known as the P3a and P3b event-related potentials, respectively (Polich, 2007).
Specifically, the classic P3a effect involves a contrast of responses to non-target deviant
and standard stimuli, and the classic P3b effect involves a contrast of target deviant and
standard stimuli. In this work, the bottom-up event-related potential effect involves a
contrast of responses to all deviant stimuli (target and non-target) and all standard stimuli.
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This contrast has more statistical power than the conventional P3a contrast because more
deviant trials are available. This approach also corresponds with a cognitive definition of
attentional orienting. One potential shortcoming of this approach, however, is that the
resultant event-related potential could contain correlates of top-down attention from the
target deviant stimuli (Bonfiglio & Carboncini, 2016). Importantly, a cognitive
subtraction approach is also used to isolate top-down attention in this paradigm, i.e.,
target deviant versus non-target deviant stimuli. This approach is necessary because a
deviant stimulus is only a target if the participant selectively attends to that deviant
stimulus when instructed (Gibson et al., 2016a). If the participant does not comply with
task instructions, the conventional P3b contrast for top-down attention (target versus
standard) could return a significant effect driven by attentional orienting to deviant
stimulation. This concern is particularly relevant for the patients in this study who could
not overtly confirm that they understood and followed task instructions. Accordingly, the
event-related potential effects in this work are not referred to as P3a and P3b eventrelated potentials and are instead described as bottom-up (or P3a-like) and top-down (or
P3b-like) event-related potential effects.
In the event-related potential analyses, data from 50 to 750 ms relative to stimulus onset
were analysed using the cluster-mass procedure of the Matlab toolbox FieldTrip
(Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). This technique was described in detail in
Chapters 2 and 3 (Gibson, Fernández-Espejo, et al., 2014; Gibson, Chennu, Owen, &
Cruse, 2014), and elsewhere (Cruse et al., 2014; Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). Briefly,
data were first compared at each time-point using a t test. In the second step, the t values
of adjacent spatiotemporal points with p<.05 were summed to form clusters. The largest
cluster was retained. This entire procedure was repeated 1,000 times with recombination
and randomized resampling of the event-related potential data. This Monte Carlo method
generated a nonparametric estimate of the p value representing the statistical significance
of the originally identified cluster.
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4.2.5.2

Experiment 2: Auditory selective attention with fMRI

The general linear model (SPM8) was used to explore effects of interest. Two event types
were defined corresponding to the on/off periods (count/relax, or vice-versa). The silent
period served as an implicit baseline for all trials. Events for these regressors were
modelled by convolving boxcar functions with the canonical hemodynamic response
function. The following nuisance variables were also included in the general linear
model: the movement parameters in the three directions of motion and three degrees of
rotation, and the mean of each scan. Linear contrasts were used to obtain subject-specific
estimates for the effect of interest. Clusters with p<.05 after the familywise error
correction were reported as significant.

4.2.5.3

Experiment 3: Command following with fMRI

Single-subject fixed-effect analyses were performed for each patient. The analysis was
based on the general linear model using the canonical hemodynamic response function
(Friston, Holmes, Poline, Price, & Frith, 1996) implemented with SPM8
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The analysis pipeline was previously reported in
Chapter 3 (Gibson, Fernández-Espejo, et al., 2014). Linear contrasts were used to obtain
subject-specific estimates, and results were thresholded at a voxel level, whole-brain
family-wise error-corrected p<.05. When no significant activations were found at this
level, the statistical threshold was reduced to an uncorrected p<.001 because of the strong
anatomical a priori hypotheses (Bardin et al., 2011; Boly et al., 2007; Fernández-Espejo
& Owen, 2013; Gibson, Fernández-Espejo, et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2010; Owen et al.,
2006; Stender et al., 2014). This less conservative threshold excluded the possibility of
failing to detect more subtle changes in the signal (Fernández-Espejo et al., 2010; Friston
et al., 1996).

4.3 Results
All patient outcomes are summarized in Table 9. Additional details concerning each
patient’s outcomes on the Coma Recovery Scale are available in Appendix D.
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Table 9. Summary of patient demographics and experimental outcomes in Chapter 4.
Sex/Age
(years)/
ID (Diagnosis)
Interval
post-ictus
(years)
VS1 (VS)
M/19/4.0

Aetiology

Evoked
Potential
(EEG)

P300
(EEG)

Voluntary
Behaviour
(CRS-R)

Selective
Mental Auditory
Imagery Attention
(fMRI) (fMRI)

Nontraumatic

Present

Absent

Absent

Absent

Absent

VS2 (VS)

F/51/0.9

Nontraumatic

Present

Absent

Absent

Absent

Absent

VS3 (VS)

M/57/3.1
(fMRI)

Nontraumatic

Present

Absent

Absent

Absent

Absent

58/4.1
(EEG)
VS4 (VS)

F/42/4.3

Nontraumatic

Present

Absent

Absent

Absent

Absent

VS5 (VS)

F/52/6.5

Nontraumatic

Present

Absent

Absent

Absent

Absent

VS6
(VS/MCS*)

F/44/20.4
(Test 1)

Traumatic Present

Present
(Test 1)

Absent

Present

Present

46/22.2
(Test 2)
VS7
(VS/MCS*)

M/23/6.0
(fMRI)

Absent
(Test 2)
Traumatic Present

Present

Absent

Present

N/A
(motion)

MCS1 (MCS-) M/40/3.1

Traumatic Present

Absent

Absent

Absent

Present

MCS2 (MCS+) M/35/16.9

Nontraumatic

Present

Object
localisation

Absent

Present

26/9.5
(EEG)

Present

Reproducible
movement to
command
MCS3 (MCS+) F/47/19.8

Nontraumatic

Present

Present

Reproducible
movement to
command

Present

Present

MCS4 (MCS-) F/25/5.7

Traumatic Present

Present

Absent

Present

Present
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Sex/Age
(years)/
Evoked
Voluntary
P300
ID (Diagnosis)
Interval Aetiology Potential
Behaviour
(EEG)
post-ictus
(EEG)
(CRS-R)
(years)
EMCS1 (EMCS) F/49/12.3
Traumatic Present
Present
Functional
object use

Selective
Mental Auditory
Imagery Attention
(fMRI) (fMRI)
Present

Absent

Functional and
accurate
communication
EMCS2 (EMCS) M/32/4.1

LIS1 (LIS)

M/55/1.5

Traumatic Present

Present

Functional
N/A
N/A
object use
(motion) (motion)
Functional and
accurate
communication

Brainstem
infarct

Present

Functional and Present
accurate
communication

Present

Present

Notes. CRS-R=Coma Recovery Scale-Revised; fMRI=functional magnetic resonance

imaging; EEG=electroencephalography; VS=Vegetative State; MCS=Minimally
Conscious State; EMCS=emergent from a Minimally Conscious State; LIS=Locked-in
Syndrome; M=male; F=female; N/A=not applicable.

4.3.1

Experiment 1: Somatosensory selective attention with EEG

A steady-state evoked potential was detected in the EEG data of all healthy volunteers
(n=15; Figure 8) and all patients (n=14; Figure 9).
Bottom-up attention effects (deviant versus standard stimuli) were detected from eight
patients and all the healthy volunteers (n=15; Figure 10). All patients who demonstrated a
differential response to the deviant versus standard stimuli also demonstrated command
following in either a behavioural or a neuroimaging-based assessment (Figure 13).
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Figure 8. Steady-state evoked responses from the healthy volunteers in Chapter 4.
Power spectra (top panels) and averaged EEG responses (bottom panels) calculated over
a 1-second period. Analyses were conducted using the data recorded from site Pz only;
each waveform (bottom panels) is depicted with ±1 standard error of the mean in colourmatched shading. **=p<0.01; ***=p<.001.
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Figure 9. Steady-state evoked responses from the patients in Chapter 4.
Power spectra (top panels) and averaged EEG responses (bottom panels) calculated over
a 1-second period. Analyses were conducted using the data recorded from site Pz only;
each waveform (bottom panels) is depicted with ±1 standard error of the mean in colourmatched shading. *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<.001.
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Figure 10. Bottom-up attention event-related potentials from Chapter 4.
Spatiotemporal clusters were calculated across all twelve electrodes and are depicted with
±1 standard error of the mean in colour-matched shading. The electrodes included in the
significant spatiotemporal cluster are enclosed with a black line on each topographic plot.
Panel A depicts the grand-averaged and Panel B depicts the single-subject event-related
potential effects for the healthy volunteers (p<9.9E-03 in all cases). Panel C depicts the
single-subject event-related potential effects for patients with statistically reliable results.
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Top-down event-related potential attention effects (target versus non-target wrist
vibrations) were not detected from any of the patients. However, this event-related
potential effect was evident for healthy volunteers at the group level (n=15) and at the
single-subject level, albeit with a hit-rate of 67% (Figure 11). Hit-rates of at least 80%
(12/15) and 100% (15/15) have been reported for fMRI-detected mental imagery and
selective attention, respectively (Naci et al., 2013). Given the low sensitivity of the topdown attention event-related potential analysis (i.e., 67%), additional post-hoc
comparisons were conducted. While the number of trials available after artefact rejection
did not differ across groups (Table 8; χ2(2)=0.21, p=0.9), some patients had many fewer
useable trials available than healthy volunteers. The single-subject event-related potential
analyses for the healthy volunteers were thus repeated in the post-hoc analyses using only
a pseudorandom subset of trials equal in number to the minimum number of trials
available in the single-subject analyses of the patient data (180 trials, in the case of
Patient MCS2).
Bottom-up attentional event-related potential effects were detected at the single-subject
level for all healthy volunteers when as few as 180 trials were included for each stimulus
type. However, top-down attentional event-related potential effects were detected from
only seven healthy volunteers. Subsequent analyses revealed that a minimum of 300 trials
were required to detect the top-down attentional event-related potential effects from the
same 10 healthy volunteers as in the a priori analyses. Four patients did not have enough
data available to meet this criterion. Overall, these analyses indicate that the top-down
attentional event-related potential effect may not have been detected in some singlesubject analyses due to low trial numbers. Nevertheless, the bottom-up attentional eventrelated potential effect was robust to data loss.

111

Figure 11. Top-down attention event-related potentials from Chapter 4.
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Spatiotemporal clusters were calculated across all twelve electrodes with each waveform
depicted with ±1 standard error of the mean in colour-matched shading. The electrodes
included in the significant spatiotemporal cluster are enclosed with a black outline on
each topographic plot. The grand-averaged result (n=15) is depicted in (A). For the single
subject results (B), only results from participants with statistically significant clusters are
shown.

4.3.2

Experiment 2: Auditory selective attention with fMRI

The results of each patient from all fMRI assessments (Experiments 2 and 3) are
summarized in Figure 12. Of the patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State, only
Patient VS6 generated a statistically differential hemodynamic response following the
instruction to count as compared to the instruction to relax. Specifically, this patient
exhibited increased activation in the temporal and parietal cortex bilaterally (family-wise
error-corrected at p<.05). Patients MCS1-4 and LIS1 also produced more hemodynamic
activation following the instruction to count than the instruction to relax (family-wise
error-corrected at p<.05 in each case). The regions differentially activated by these
patients are as follows: Patient MCS1, frontotemporal and parietal cortex bilaterally;
Patient MCS2, temporal cortex bilaterally; Patient MCS3, parietal cortex bilaterally;
Patient MCS4, frontotemporal and parietal cortex bilaterally; and Patient LIS1,
frontotemporal cortex bilaterally. Notably, Patient EMCS1 did not show differences in
activation in the command following task even though she was able to follow commands
with her overt behaviour immediately prior to her assessment. Patients VS7 and EMCS2
were excluded from this analysis because both patients moved excessively during their
functional scan.
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Figure 12. Summary of fMRI outcomes from Chapter 4.
SMA=supplementary motor area; OPJ=occipito-parietal junction; TOPJ=temporooccipito-parietal junction; PHC=parahippocampal cortex; IFG=inferior frontal gyrus.
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Only positive results are depicted. For the fMRI mental imagery paradigms, significant
task-related fMRI activation is labelled by region (Imagery>Rest), and results are
thresholded at an uncorrected p<.001. For the fMRI selective auditory attention task, only
activation clusters within the attention network (Count>Relax) that survived the
familywise error correction threshold of p<.05 at the whole-brain level are displayed. All
fMRI results are rendered on each patient’s T1 anatomical MRI image, and scales
depicting the statistical maps (t values) are inset.
a

Patient MCS1 scored in the Vegetative State range immediately prior to his participation

in the EEG assessment. However, this patient scored in the Minimally Conscious State
Minus range in another CRS assessment several hours prior to his participation in this
EEG investigation. For this reason, this patient has been classified as being in a
Minimally Conscious State Minus.

4.3.3

Experiment 3: Command following with fMRI

The results of each patient from all fMRI assessments (Experiments 2 and 3) are
summarized in Figure 12. In her first visit, Patient VS6 produced reliable, appropriate
activation during the motor imagery task in the supplementary motor area and cerebellum
bilaterally at an uncorrected p<.001 (cluster level family-wise error-corrected p<.05). In
her second visit, Patient VS6 produced reliable, isolated clusters of activation during the
motor imagery and spatial navigation tasks in the left precentral gyrus at an uncorrected
p<.001 (cluster level family-wise error-corrected p<.05). The patient was thus
reclassified as being in a non-behavioural Minimally Conscious State (Gosseries, Zasler,
& Laureys, 2014). Patients VS7 showed high levels of motion requiring 37% and 37.5%
of his data to be discarded for motor imagery and spatial navigation, respectively. The
analysis of the remaining data only revealed appropriate activation during the spatial
navigation task (i.e., the left occipito-parietal junction at uncorrected p<.001.). The
patient was also reclassified as being in a non-behavioural Minimally Conscious State
(Gosseries et al., 2014).
Patients MCS3, MCS4, EMCS1, and LIS1 also only showed reliable activation during
the spatial navigation task. This involved: bilateral occipito-parietal junction (uncorrected
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p<.001) for MCS3; right temporo-occipito-parietal junction (family-wise error-corrected
p<.05), as well as right dorsal premotor cortex, right insular cortex, and right putamen
(uncorrected p<.001) for MCS4; right occipito-parietal junction, a region in the
boundaries between right lingual gyrus/parahippocampal cortex, left precentral gyrus
(comprising the supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas), as well as some less
typical areas such as the inferior frontal gyrus, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the
left striatum (family-wise error-corrected p<.05) for EMCS1; and the supplementary
motor area, right precentral gyrus, occipito-parietal junction, posterior temporo-occipital
region, and cerebellum (uncorrected p<.001) for LIS1. The remaining seven patients
(VS1-5, MCS1, and MCS2) showed no activation at the conservative family-wise errorcorrected statistical threshold, or at uncorrected p<.001.

4.3.4

Correspondence between command following and EEG
responses

The main hypothesis in this investigation was that patients who were aware would exhibit
EEG markers of higher-order attention processing. While top-down processing was not
detected in the event-related potentials from any patients, an interesting relationship is
evident between a specific marker of awareness—command following—and the bottomup event-related potential effect. A patient was considered aware if he or she
demonstrated command following in any one of the three assessments not based upon
EEG responses (i.e., selective auditory attention, mental imagery, or a behavioural
assessment with the Coma Recovery Scale). This approach is consistent with clinical
behavioural guidelines in which a diagnosis of awareness (Minimally Conscious State) is
given if a patient reliably follows a command across multiple trials (Kalmar & Giacino,
2005). A Fisher’s exact test revealed a significant positive association between command
following and event-related potential evidence of bottom-up attention (p=.007; note
p=.0047 if the two observations of Patient VS6 are not included to maintain the
assumption of independence). This relationship is summarised in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Summary of the relationship between command following and the EEG
outcomes of Experiment 1 in Chapter 4.
fMRI=functional magnetic resonance imaging; VS=Vegetative State; MCS=Minimally
Conscious State; EMCS=emergent from a Minimally Conscious State; LIS=Locked-in
Syndrome. The summary depicts the number of patients and healthy volunteers who
generated each of the three possible outcomes (i.e., sensory response [steady-state evoked
potential], bottom-up attention [event-related potential], or top-down attention [eventrelated potential]) on the somatosensory selective attention task (Experiment 1, EEG).

4.3.5

Replication data

The replication results are depicted in Figure 14. All patients exhibited consistent effects
across assessments apart from Patient VS6. For Patient VS6, the bottom-up attention
event-related potential effect was only detected during her initial assessment.
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Figure 14. Replication data from the follow-up visits with some patients in Chapter 4.
Data are depicted for the initial and follow up tests of Patients VS4, MCS3, EMCS1, and
VS6, as labelled. For the steady-state evoked potentials, power spectra (top left panels
within each cell) and averaged EEG data (bottom left panels within each cell) were
calculated over a 1-second period. Analyses were conducted using the data recorded from
site Pz only; each waveform is depicted with ±1 standard error of the mean in colour-
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matched shading. For the bottom-up attention event-related potential effects (right panels
within each cell), spatiotemporal clusters were calculated across all twelve electrodes and
are depicted with ±1 standard error of the mean in colour-matched shading. The
electrodes included in the significant spatiotemporal cluster are enclosed with a black line
on each topographic plot. The temporal boundaries and the probability value of each
cluster are indicated with shading and inset text. For Patient VS6 only, two separate fMRI
assessments were conducted at each testing session. For the fMRI mental imagery
paradigm, significant task-related fMRI activation is depicted (Imagery>Rest), and
results are thresholded at an uncorrected p<.001. For the fMRI selective auditory
attention task, only activation clusters within the attention network (Count>Relax) that
survived the familywise error correction threshold of p<.05 at the whole-brain level are
displayed. The fMRI results are rendered on the patient’s T1 anatomical MRI image, and
scales depicting the statistical maps (t values) are inset.
*=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<.001; n.s.=not statistically significant.

4.4 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter, fourteen patients with severe brain injuries underwent a novel EEG-based
assessment of residual sensory and cognitive processing. The EEG outcomes were
compared with two fMRI-based assessments of covert command following and one
behavioural assessment of overt command following. The primary novel finding of this
work was the relationship between an event-related potential marker of bottom-up
attention orienting and command following. Specifically, all patients with the eventrelated potential bottom-up attention effect (P300) demonstrated command following.
Similarly, most patients who did not generate an event-related potential marker of
bottom-up attention also did not demonstrate command following (Figure 13).
Some investigators have reported positive prognostic value in the presence of a P300
following traumatic brain injury (Cavinato et al., 2009; Lew et al., 2003). There have
also been reports of correlations between cognitive event-related potentials and
behavioural markers of awareness (Kotchoubey et al., 2005; Schnakers et al., 2008).
Furthermore, other investigators have found that cognitive event-related potentials are
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predictive of recovery in patients with acute disorders of consciousness (Steppacher et
al., 2013; Wijnen, van Boxtel, Eilander, & de Gelder, 2007). Crucially, the current study
included two neuroimaging-based assessments of covert command following. This step is
important given that a recent meta-analysis estimated a 15% rate of covert awareness
among patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State (Kondziella et al., 2016).
Previous studies of the P300 in patients with disorders of consciousness are likely to have
included patients capable of covert command following, thus obscuring the relationship
reported here. While the feasibility of routine neuroimaging assessments in clinical
practice is limited by health, safety, and financial factors, the findings of this work
suggest that these assessments are necessary to elucidate the relationship between a
patient’s conscious state and his or her residual sensory and cognitive abilities.
It is curious that an event-related potential marker of unconscious (or preconscious)
processing is closely linked to awareness in this work. Indeed, the classic event-related
potential marker of bottom-up attention, the P300, can be elicited by unattended stimuli
and during REM sleep and deep sedation (Chennu & Bekinschtein, 2012; Polich, 2007).
It may be that the correspondence between the event-related potential marker of bottomup attention and command following stems from the overlap of the neural networks that
support attention. Such networks are relatively more preserved in conscious patients
(Fernández-Espejo et al., 2012; Thibaut et al., 2012). Moreover, frontal lobe lesions have
been associated with diminished P300 responses to auditory and somatosensory
stimulation (Knight, 1984; Yamaguchi & Knight, 1991a). Notably, this association
suggests that a P300 response may be less informative for patients with specific frontal
lobe injuries. Nevertheless, a P300 can be elicited without the explicit collaboration of
the individual—i.e., without following task instructions (Chennu & Bekinschtein, 2012).
This feature is appealing because it suggests that a passive assessment of attention
orienting, which entails lower cognitive demands than active assessments of voluntary
top-down attention, may be sufficient to identify patients with covert awareness.
The P3b-like event-related potential marker of top-down attention was not detected from
any of the patients in this sample. A similar finding has been previously reported in one
study of patients in a Minimally Conscious State (Pokorny et al., 2013). It has also been
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suggested that the single-subject sensitivity of the P3b is too low for clinical awareness
detection (Höller et al., 2013). While the single-subject sensitivity of the P300 is typically
100% in healthy volunteers, the single-subject sensitivity of the P3b ranges from about
44% to 70% (Höller et al., 2011, 2013; Kotchoubey, Lang, Herb, Maurer, & Birbaumer,
2004). Notably, P3b-like event-related potentials in the current work were detected from
only 67% (10/15) of the healthy volunteers when relying upon a cognitive subtraction to
isolate top-down attentional processing. However, the conventional P3b contrast yielded
a hit-rate of 100% from the healthy volunteers. As highlighted in the Methods section,
this conventional contrast does not necessarily isolate top-down attention in this
paradigm. Indeed, the conventional P3b contrast of target deviant versus standard is no
different from the conventional P300 contrast of non-target deviant versus standard if the
participant does not comply with the instruction to selectively attend to certain deviant
stimuli. For this reason, a cognitive subtraction (target deviant versus non-target deviant)
is needed quantify any differences in responses to deviant stimuli due to top-down,
selective attention. Alternatively, the oddball task used in this investigation frequently
involved the presentation of a deviant stimulus after three standard stimuli (49% of
trials). Greater variability in the rate of deviant stimulus presentation may reduce
expectancy effects and elicit more stable P3b-like event-related potentials in future work.
Finally, the P3b effect was not detected from any patients in this study using either the
cognitive subtraction technique or the conventional contrast. For this reason, it is not
clear from this investigation whether event-related potential markers of top-down
attention will facilitate the differential diagnosis of disorders of consciousness.
As a final consideration, time-variant levels of arousal and fatigue characteristic of
disorders of consciousness may have led to inconsistent engagement in the EEG counting
task (Giacino, Fins, Laureys, & Schiff, 2014; Whyte et al., 2013). Participants were
required to sustain attention for five minutes in blocks of about twenty-two seconds for
both fMRI tasks, whereas the EEG task involved fifteen minutes of attention in blocks of
about one minute. The EEG task was longer to ensure that a high EEG signal-to-noise
ratio was achieved, and post-hoc analyses confirmed that the top-down event-related
potential effect was sensitive to data loss. Unfortunately, increased task duration requires
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participants to sustain attention for an even longer period and may have contributed to the
low sensitivity of this marker in the patient cohort. Some investigators use machine
learning to circumvent these issues and address possible time-dependent variations in the
electrocortical responses of patients with brain injuries (e.g., King et al., 2013). For
simplicity of interpretation and consistency with clinical methods, however, a more
traditional event-related potential voltage comparison was used in the current work.
Notably, statistical reliability was assessed with permutation testing following the
recommendations of other researchers in this field (Billinger et al., 2013; Goldfine et al.,
2013; Noirhomme et al., 2014). Although machine-learning techniques may have
rendered a more sensitive description of time-variant results, the analyses were conducted
in line with recommended practice for this type of translational research.
In closing, the determination of whether patients with disorders of consciousness are
aware is a clinical standard of care. To influence clinical practice, it is essential to
compare novel assessments with existing techniques. The current investigation directly
compared two previously established fMRI-based assessments of covert command
following (Naci & Owen, 2013; Owen et al., 2006) and one novel EEG-based
hierarchical cognitive assessment (Gibson et al., 2016b). The results of the fMRI
assessments converged for nine of the twelve patients with useable data from both
paradigms, and an EEG marker of attentional orienting (the P300) identified patients with
the ability to follow commands. The behavioural profile of disorders of consciousness—
that is, time-variant fatigue and arousal—always affords the possibility that a patient did
not demonstrate covert command following due to lack of voluntary engagement in the
mental task. Likewise, false negatives occur in assessments of healthy volunteers (e.g.,
Cruse et al., 2011; Fernández-Espejo, Norton, & Owen, 2014). Nevertheless, the less
than perfect correspondence of the assessments of covert command following reported
here may have occurred because the demands of a given task were better suited to some
patients than others. For example, some individuals find it difficult to engage in motor
imagery (Hammer et al., 2011; Vidaurre & Blankertz, 2010), and in some reports, braincomputer interfaces driven by the neural correlates of selective attention are successfully
operated by more users than brain-computer interfaces driven by the neural correlates of
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imagined movement (Guger et al., 2009; Guger, Edlinger, Harkam, Niedermayer, &
Pfurtscheller, 2003). Accordingly, assessments of covert command following based on
selective attention may be better suited to a general population. Overall, however, an
optimal evaluation of a patient with a disorder of consciousness should include multiple
assessments to maximise the likelihood of detecting responses that are not evident from
overt behaviour. In the absence of unambiguous ground truth, an investigation of the
concordance between assessments may be the best way to improve diagnostic and
prognostic accuracy.
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Chapter 5

5

General Discussion

5.1 Key contributions and limitations
Patients with disorders of consciousness have significant behavioural impairments due to
their severe brain injuries. Patients in a Vegetative State exhibit no voluntary behaviour
and lack awareness of all external stimulation, while patients in a Minimally Conscious
State exhibit variable, but reproducible, voluntary behaviour and awareness (Bernat,
2006). It is difficult to differentially diagnose disorders of consciousness, and neural
correlates of minimal versus absent awareness are occasionally used to complement and
supplement behavioural evaluations (Giacino, Fins, Laureys, & Schiff, 2014; Laureys,
2005; Owen, 2013). A small number of patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State
demonstrate covert awareness through appropriate and reliable modulations of their brain
activity in response to verbal commands (Bardin, Schiff, & Voss, 2012; Cruse et al.,
2011; Goldfine, Victor, Conte, Bardin, & Schiff, 2011; Owen et al., 2006). The aim of
this thesis was to improve existing EEG-based assessments of covert command following
and cognition to further facilitate the differential diagnosis of disorders of consciousness
at the bedside. Novel techniques were validated in healthy volunteers, and all patients
underwent assessments based upon behaviour, EEG, and fMRI. Strategies to improve the
sensitivity of single-subject analyses of neuroimaging data were discussed in all
empirical chapters, including customised mental tasks and distinct neural correlates of the
mental processes of interest.
Together, the three experiments described in this thesis have advanced the scientific and
clinical understanding of disorders of consciousness in at least two ways. Firstly,
paradigms and stimuli that are customized to a participant can result in more reliable
single-subject outcomes. Indeed, the primary finding of Chapter 2 was that musicians
generated enhanced responses to motor imagery involving musical performance relative
to motor imagery of other actions. The customisation of the motor imagery task to the
participants’ previous experiences accordingly resulted in a more sensitive detection of

132

volitional brain responses. Unfortunately, customised motor imagery did not facilitate the
detection of covert command following from the small sample of patients with disorders
of consciousness in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, this study involving patients contributed to
the second major finding of this thesis: assessments of multiple cognitive abilities,
supported by distinct brain regions and neural signatures, are needed to characterise a
patient’s level of residual cognition. Indeed, many patients in Chapters 3 and 4
demonstrated covert command following in only one assessment. For instance, one
patient in Chapter 3 had selective damage to cortical motor areas; this patient did not
produce a reliable brain response to motor imagery, but she did produce a robust brain
response to mental imagery involving spatial navigation. In Chapter 4, an event-related
potential marker of attentional orienting (the P300) identified patients with the ability to
follow commands. This finding indicates that a simple bedside assessment of oddball
detection may be sufficient to identify patients with residual cognitive abilities or
awareness. Notably, multiple assessments of the same patient in Chapters 3 and 4 did not
always yield converging results; for example, some patients did not exhibit both EEGand fMRI-based responses to motor imagery (Chapter 3) or selective attention (Chapter
4). Nevertheless, if the patients discussed in this thesis had been assessed on just one
occasion, or repeatedly with the same mental task, their covert cognitive abilities may
have never been identified. Accordingly, customized assessments that probe a patient’s
abilities in more than one sensory domain and with more than one neural correlate are a
promising way to minimise false negatives in the detection of covert cognition and
awareness.
A common limitation of all three empirical chapters in this thesis is the possibility of
attribution errors. Attribution errors in the detection of covert cognition and awareness
carry significant consequences. Among other possibilities, patients may receive
unsuitable care, medical resources may be inappropriately used, and families may suffer
unnecessary emotional distress or financial loss (Jox, Bernat, Laureys, & Racine, 2012;
Peterson, Cruse, Naci, Weijer, & Owen, 2015). In terms of false negatives—i.e., the
failure to attribute awareness to a patient who is aware, validation studies with healthy
volunteers can eliminate some confounding factors in patient assessments. For example,
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healthy volunteers can overtly confirm or deny their conformance with tasks demands to
identify the neural correlates of compliant, successful task performance. However,
assessments of patients with severe brain injuries are designed to be response-free with
low cognitive demands; findings based on the responses of healthy volunteers to simple
cognitive tasks may not generalise to patients. Additionally, 10 to 30% of healthy
volunteers generate negative results in mental imagery paradigms under optimal
performance conditions (Vidaurre & Blankertz, 2010). Single-subject effects may also
differ from group effects in neuroimaging paradigms due to variations in individual brain
structure. Moreover, patients may produce negative results because they do not
understand a task, or because they temporarily exhibit reduced responsiveness secondary
to a medical comorbidity. In future work, healthy volunteers could be instructed to ignore
commands in some blocks of trials to characterise the neural correlates of interest during
volitional inhibition (Owen et al., 2007). Similarly, target neural responses could be
validated during natural fluctuations in vigilance, such as distraction or drowsiness
(Chennu & Bekinschtein, 2012). Nevertheless, it may be impossible to identify the
ground truth about awareness in the absence of self-report, and false negatives in the
attribution of awareness are a pervasive challenge in studies of patients with disorders of
consciousness.
False positives—i.e., the ascription of awareness to a patient who is not aware—are also
possible in the attribution of covert awareness. False positives may occur due to
variations in statistical thresholds and analysis techniques. Statistical corrections for
multiple comparisons and restrictions of analyses to brain or scalp regions of interest are
commonly used in neuroimaging studies to reduce false positives (Bennett, Wolford, &
Miller, 2009; Kilner, 2013; Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009).
Similarly, permutation tests are preferred to binomial tests to reduce false positives in the
statistical assessment of classification outcomes in this field (Cruse, Chennu, et al., 2013;
Goldfine et al., 2013; Noirhomme et al., 2014). Additionally, however, false positives
may occur if a brain response of interest does not correlate with a volitional mental
process. For example, linguistic stimuli in mental imagery paradigms could elicit
involuntary neural responses (Greenberg, 2007; Nachev & Husain, 2007). Indeed, action
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words such as “kick” or “lick” correlate with a few seconds of activation in brain areas
associated with motor function (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004). Notably,
unconscious mental representations persist for a few seconds or less (Greenwald &
Draine, 1996; Naccache et al., 2005). The prolonged responses (30 seconds) necessary in
fMRI-based assessments of covert command following accordingly provide compelling
evidence of sustained, and arguably conscious, responses to verbal commands (Dehaene
& Naccache, 2001; Naccache, 2006; Owen et al., 2007). As an additional consideration,
the incidence of positive neuroimaging results is lower than the incidence of negative
neuroimaging results in studies of covert awareness. For example, approximately 15% of
patients diagnosed as being in a Vegetative State can covertly follow commands
(Kondziella, Friberg, Frokjaer, Fabricius, & Møller, 2016), and only about 45% of
patients who could overtly follow commands also demonstrated covert command
following in one large clinical validation study (Stender et al., 2014). Nevertheless,
clinicians and scientists must ensure that appropriate analytical techniques and construct
validity are applied to the clinical determination of awareness, regardless of whether
positive or negative results are obtained.

5.2 Understanding consciousness via acquired brain injury
Historically, acquired and congenital brain injuries have provided unique opportunities to
study cognition and perception in humans (Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2015). For
example, the famous patient Henry Molaison (“H.M.”) had a large portion of his medial
temporal lobe removed to treat intractable epilepsy (Scoville & Milner, 1957). Although
this surgery resulted in profound memory loss for the patient, his subsequent participation
in research significantly advanced understanding of the hippocampus and other medial
temporal lobe structures in human memory (Eichenbaum, 2013). Moreover, this patient
and the subsequent understanding of his abilities and impairments helped guide surgical
practice toward the minimally invasive protocols used today (Mauguiere & Corkin,
2015). It may be that patients with disorders of consciousness, who present with profound
disruptions to the behaviours commonly ascribed to awareness, provide a similar
opportunity to study consciousness in humans.
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The bad news about the scientific study of consciousness, particularly when relying upon
patients with disorders of consciousness, is both logistical and philosophical in nature.
Firstly, it is difficult to obtain a sufficient quantity of high-quality neural data from
patients with disorders of consciousness. Most patients lack voluntary motor control and
exhibit fluctuations in arousal. Accordingly, patients who remain alert throughout an
assessment are likely to move, and patients who do not move during an assessment may
not be alert or awake. The former scenario results in data loss due to motion-related
artefacts, while the latter scenario results in data with insufficient construct validity to
assess conscious processing. Furthermore, patients with disorders of consciousness
typically have severe and diffuse acquired brain injuries. Findings concerning the neural
structures or functions that support conscious processing in these patients may not
generalize to persons with healthy brains. As a second consideration, it is difficult to
operationalize conscious processing. There are several philosophical, psychological, and
neurobiological perspectives on the neural correlates of consciousness (e.g., Chalmers,
2000; Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992; Hohwy, 2009; Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002).
However, consensus has not yet been reached as to how best measure consciousness
within existing theoretical frameworks (Block, 2007; Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans,
Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008). For instance, self-report is one of the only widely accepted
techniques to identify self-awareness (Naccache, 2006; Weiskrantz, 1997).
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the neural mechanisms that underlie self-report,
especially those pertaining to linguistic and gestural communication, can be isolated from
the neural mechanisms that underlie awareness (Block, 2007; Lamme, 2006; Seth et al.,
2008). This issue is particularly problematic for patients with disorders of consciousness;
most patients with disorders of consciousness cannot overtly respond, and yet patients
who can follow commands using neural correlates of volitional mental tasks exhibit
compelling evidence of awareness (Owen, 2013; Stins & Laureys, 2009).
Notwithstanding its inherent limitations, the scientific study of consciousness involving
patients with disorders of consciousness has elucidated the now classic distinction
between wakefulness and awareness in human subjective experience. It is remarkable that
a person can survive a catastrophic brain injury; present with an apparent absence of all
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voluntary behaviour and responsiveness to external stimulation; and yet retain cycles of
wakefulness and quiescence. In a healthy brain, the brainstem ascending reticular
activating system regulates cyclical wakefulness through diffuse afferent connections to
the thalamus and cerebral cortex (Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949; Plum & Posner, 1972).
Many patients with disorders of consciousness present with periods of wakefulness and
non-wakefulness because their reticular activating systems are spared from injury, whilst
insults to other brain structures lead to the profound disruptions in awareness
characteristic of these disorders (Bernat, 2006). Owing in part to this dissociation
between wakefulness and awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness,
consciousness is now often described as a continuum of abilities with different modes of
operation (Bayne & Hohwy, 2007; Blume, Del Giudice, Wislowska, Lechinger, &
Schabus, 2015). Furthermore, awareness can persist in the absence of wakefulness. For
example, healthy sleepers have demonstrated priming effects, movement preparation, and
preliminary attentional processing in different stages of sleep (Bareham, Manly,
Pustovaya, Scott, & Bekinschtein, 2014; Chennu & Bekinschtein, 2012; Hobson, 2009).
Likewise, some patients with disorders of consciousness exhibit severely disrupted sleep
architecture, and many patients possess no discernible circadian rhythm, even though
they occasionally exhibit voluntary behaviour (Cologan et al., 2010; Cruse, Thibaut, et
al., 2013; De Weer et al., 2011). In light of these findings, a promising future direction in
the scientific study of consciousness is to determine whether awareness can persist in the
complete absence of wakefulness characteristic of the comatose state. Such evidence
would provide a fascinating new perspective on our understanding of subjective
experience via acquired brain injury.
From a scientific standpoint, preserved awareness in some patients with disorders of
consciousness suggests that the neural correlates of consciousness are dependent on
whole brain integrity rather than a designated brain structure per se. For example, some
researchers posit that awareness is supported by two distinct cortical networks: (1) a
network pertaining to external awareness of information perceived using the senses, and
(2) a network pertaining to internal awareness of stimulus-independent thoughts
(Demertzi et al., 2011; Demertzi, Soddu, & Laureys, 2013; Heine et al., 2012;
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Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). Within these networks, activity in the frontoparietal
network is impaired in most patients in a Vegetative State and in many healthy volunteers
during slow wave sleep, deep anaesthesia, and absence seizures (Blumenfeld, 2012;
Boveroux et al., 2008; Cavinato et al., 2015; Thibaut et al., 2012). Additionally, it has
been hypothesised that executive function, which correlates with activity in frontoparietal
brain networks, could serve as a cognitive proxy for human consciousness (Naci, Cusack,
Anello, & Owen, 2014; Naci & Owen, 2013). From a functional perspective, executive
function enables an organism to process information from the external environment to
make predictions and plan behaviours (Stuss & Knight, 2013). In this respect, executive
function is the cognitive equivalent of generating an internal experience from external
stimulation and may accordingly index conscious processing. Finally, many state-of-theart psychological hypotheses posit that consciousness arises from wide-scale brain
function (e.g., Cleeremans, 2011; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent,
2006; Tononi, 2004). Patients with disorders of consciousness provide valuable
opportunities to evaluate and refine all models of conscious processing, and the study of
these patients continues to inform leading theoretical accounts of consciousness as a
psychological construct.
The most impactful discovery in the scientific study of consciousness via acquired brain
injury may pertain to the patients with disorders of consciousness themselves. There is
robust evidence that patients in a Vegetative State lack both behavioural and neural
responses to external stimulation (Bernat, 2006). Some patients in a chronic Vegetative
State exhibit cerebral metabolism arguably more similar to brain death than healthy
wakefulness (Laureys, Owen, & Schiff, 2004). It is very unlikely that patients with
chronic disorders of consciousness, particularly those in a Vegetative State, will regain
functional independence (Royal College of Physicians Working Group, 1996, 2003).
Nevertheless, clinicians and most other people are appropriately cautious to designate any
patient as completely ‘unaware’, and early neuroimaging-based research supported this
intuition by demonstrating that some patients in a Vegetative State could engage in
complex information processing (e.g., Owen et al., 2002; Schiff et al., 2002). After about
a decade of additional study, it is now acknowledged that a substantial minority of
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patients in a Vegetative State can volitionally modulate their brain activity in response to
command (Giacino et al., 2014; Gosseries, Zasler, & Laureys, 2014; Kondziella et al.,
2016; Owen et al., 2006). It is a fascinating and somewhat incidental scientific finding
that the neural mechanisms thought to support awareness can persist following such
profound disruption. For the small number of patients with residual awareness, however,
the detection of covert command following may be life changing, particularly if their
ability to communicate is restored.

5.3 Recommendations and future directions
Recent advancements in neuroimaging technology and technical computing have led to
innovative developments in neuroscience research and related medical practice. Our
understanding of the abilities of patients with disorders of consciousness has been
substantially advanced by assessments that are not contingent on motor output and
instead rely on brain responses. Significantly, it is now understood that some patients
who lack overt responsiveness following catastrophic brain injury can exhibit sleep-wake
cycles and engage in voluntary regulation of their brain activity in response to command.
Although these two findings are revolutionary for the clinical understanding of patients
with disorders of consciousness, and provide some insight into the neural basis of
consciousness in general, the study of disorders of consciousness needs new growth.
Three promising ways forward are discussed next with reference to the findings of this
thesis and the relevant current literature.
The first area of recommended growth for the study of disorders of consciousness is the
conduct of large-scale, multicentre, clinical validation studies. Indeed, this manner of
inquiry may be the only way forward for medical purposes (Laureys & Schiff, 2012).
Some physicians and other people involved in patient care are sceptical of neuroimagingbased approaches, even though these approaches facilitate differential diagnosis in some
cases (Owen, 2013). This scepticism arises in part because many people adopt
behaviourist approaches to assess awareness (Kurthen, Moskopp, Linke, & Reuter, 1991;
Plum & Posner, 1972). Furthermore, most investigations that use neuroimaging rely upon
single cases or small, heterogeneous cohorts of patients with disorders of consciousness
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to validate techniques. These small-scale investigations provide valuable proof-ofconcept for future clinical trials, but do not provide sufficient evidence to warrant
adoption in standard medical practice. Additionally, the primary aim of most
neuroimaging-based investigations involving patients with disorders of consciousness is
to facilitate differential diagnosis. However, the prediction of recovery, especially during
the acute treatment phase, is at least equally as important from a clinical perspective. A
few candidate neural markers of recovery exist: for example, patients with higher
cerebral metabolism, or resting EEG with higher complexity, are more likely to recover
awareness (Babiloni et al., 2009; Bagnato et al., 2010; Di, Boly, Weng, Ledoux, &
Laureys, 2008; Stender et al., 2016). Unfortunately, the prediction of the absence of
recovery is more reliable than the prediction of recovery (Stender et al., 2014; Wijdicks,
Hijdra, Young, Bassetti, & Wiebe, 2006). Accordingly, investigations concerning the
neural markers of positive prognosis in the acute treatment phase are needed. With
appropriate validation in large, multicentre cohorts of patients, neuroimaging-based
techniques will significantly advance knowledge and standards of care pertaining to
diagnosis, prognosis, and medical management of patients with disorders of
consciousness.
A second avenue of progress for the study of disorders of consciousness is the
implementation of feedback in brain-computer interface-based paradigms intended to
support two-way communication with these patients. It is unlikely that many patients will
possess the cognitive resources needed to communicate with a brain-computer interface;
to the best of my knowledge, fewer than ten patients with disorders of consciousness
have communicated using neuroimaging techniques to date (Bardin et al., 2012;
Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013; Forgacs et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2010; Naci & Owen,
2013). Nevertheless, other patients with prolonged immobility from severe motor
impairments have already benefited from brain-computer interfaces. For example, stateof-the-art brain-computer interfaces have provided patients who are quadriplegic with a
reasonably sophisticated ability to grasp objects using a mechanical arm (Hochberg et al.,
2006, 2012). Other brain-computer interfaces have provided patients who are paralysed
with the ability to create simple graphic designs (Münßinger et al., 2010). Similarly, a
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few patients diagnosed as being in a Minimally Conscious State have successfully
operated brain-computer interfaces presented as simple video games, such as moving a
ball to a basket with motor imagery or selecting a target photograph with a reward in a
forced choice paradigm (Coyle, Carroll, Stow, McCreadie, & Mcelligott, 2013; Coyle,
Stow, McCreadie, McElligott, & Carroll, 2015; Pan et al., 2014). Notably, these
successful brain-computer interfaces provide direct, online feedback to the user. Indeed,
effective feedback provides users with positive reinforcement and entertainment to
reduce frustration and fatigue (Kleih & Kübler, 2013; Nijboer, Birbaumer, & Kübler,
2010; Wolpaw, Birbaumer, McFarland, Pfurtscheller, & Vaughan, 2002). Changes in
feedback could also identify sleep onset or lack of interest (e.g., a sudden drop in
performance mid-session). While it is not known how many patients possess the
cognitive resources needed to communicate using a brain-computer interface, the
implementation of feedback is an important next step toward the restoration of
communication and environmental control for patients with disorders of consciousness.
A third and final way forward for the study of disorders of consciousness pertains to
ethical models of patient care. For example, a primary claim of this thesis is that multimodal assessments are needed to minimize false negatives in the attribution of awareness.
A patient is likely to exhibit divergent outcomes on different assessments due to the
heterogeneous nature of severe, acquired brain injuries and the unusual behavioural
profile characteristic of disorders of consciousness. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how
to interpret conflicting outcomes or to communicate feedback from contradictory findings
to a care team or family member (Fins, 2013; Graham et al., 2015). A primary concern is
that positive evidence from only one assessment in a battery will undermine confidence
in the positive result, even though the incidence of positive outcomes is lower than the
incidence of negative outcomes overall. Alternatively, communication via fMRI has been
a possibility since at least 2009 (Sorger et al., 2009). Other neuroimaging techniques,
such as functional near-infrared spectroscopy and EEG, also offer pragmatic solutions to
issues of infrastructure and expense in standard clinical practice (Chatelle, Lesenfants,
Guller, Laureys, & Noirhomme, 2015; Naci et al., 2012; Naseer & Hong, 2015). The
development of bedside brain-computer interface-based communication will accordingly
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warrant additional consideration of medical decision making for non-communicative
patients. Although brain-computer interface output may be sufficient for the
identification of at least minimal consciousness, there may be no level of confidence in
communicative brain-computer interface output that is appropriately high to inform major
medical decisions (Fins & Schiff, 2010; Mackenzie, 2013; Peterson et al., 2013). As
medical knowledge and related technology advances, it is essential to revisit the ethical
framework pertaining to patient care to ensure that a patient’s rights and best interests are
respected (Fins, 2009; Weijer et al., 2014).

5.4 Conclusions and extrapolations
The scientific and clinical understanding of patients with disorders of consciousness has
been revolutionised by neuroimaging in the last twenty years. Nevertheless, the
differential diagnosis of awareness remains a challenging clinical determination. In this
thesis, neuroimaging-based assessments that probe a patient’s abilities in more than one
sensory domain and with more than one neural correlate were applied to reduce false
negatives in the attribution of awareness. The novel EEG assessments were developed
with reference to existing gold standards and implemented with relatively simple and
inexpensive bedside acquisition protocols. Over the next twenty years, it is expected that
some patients with disorders of consciousness will be able to communicate at the bedside
using similar techniques. Such technology will be accessible and widely available owing
to further advancements in commercial human-machine interfaces for healthy users. At
that time, many patients will have experienced brain-facilitated device control prior to
their injuries. These factors will in turn enhance a suitable patient’s ability to demonstrate
volitional modulations of his or her brain activity during rehabilitation. Notably, it is
anticipated that patients with chronic disorders of consciousness will continue to reap no
direct benefit from translational research because curative treatment will remain unlikely.
Nonetheless, many patients will experience an improved quality of life because
affordable brain-computer interfaces will provide them with entertainment, two-way
communication, and correspondingly sensitive care. In short, research pertaining to
disorders of consciousness in the next twenty years will continue to instigate positive
changes and impactful scientific discoveries for researchers, clinicians, and patients alike.
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Appendix C: Supplementary data for Chapter 2.
Supplementary Table C-1. Single-trial classification outcomes for Experiment 1 of
Chapter 2.

Participant
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
M
SE

Simple Imagery
vs. Rest
Acc
Time
#TP
59.13
3.9
0
66.70*
3.1*
24*
60.87
2.3
0
57.36
3.9
0
58.78
2.4
0
61.80*
3.5*
3*
59.36
2.9
0
59.26
4.9
0
59.71
2.5
0
66.43*
4.6*
26*
64.42*
3.5*
6*
57.81
2.4
0
57.80
2.1
0
61.57
3.1
0
58.15
3.0
0
61.74
3.6
0

Complex Imagery
vs. Rest
Acc
Time
#TP
56.97
3.1
0
64.81*
3.1*
10*
60.43
3.3
0
68.76*
2.8*
25*
62.58*
3.8*
5*
56.89
3.2
0
58.11
2.5
0
66.58*
3.4*
19*
60.35
3.0
0
66.19*
4.3*
31*
67.44*
4.6*
20*
64.23*
4.5*
12*
64.04*
3.7*
25*
63.10*
5.1*
4*
59.16*
4.5*
1*
64.14*
2.2*
4*

60.68
0.74

62.64
0.93

3.22
0.20

3.69
2.13

3.55
0.21

9.69
2.71

Notes. Acc=maximum cross-validated classification accuracy (%); Time=time of Acc
(seconds following offset of auditory cue); #TP=number of time points for which
statistically reliable classification results were obtained; M=mean; SE=standard error of
the mean.
*p<.05, with False Discovery Rate correction for multiple comparisons

155

Supplementary Table C-2. Single-trial classification outcomes for Experiment 2 of
Chapter 2.

Participant
Pianist
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Piano Imagery
vs. Rest
Acc
Time
#TP

Hockey Imagery
vs. Rest
Acc
Time #TP

Hand Squeeze Imagery
vs. Rest
Acc
Time
#TP

63.45
59.31
58.20
60.15
68.24*
56.67
66.02*
76.25*
69.76*
59.48
59.08
63.27*
57.50
73.99*
59.78
61.81

3.2
4.1
1.8
2.0
4.4*
3.3
2.9*
4.4*
4.9*
3.9
3.6
5.2*
3.7
4.3*
3.9
4.9

14*
0
0
0
39*
0
32*
71*
29*
0
0
12*
0
64*
0
0

60.91
63.75
63.32
62.36
70.28*
59.72
69.08*
75.31*
65.07
62.71
53.33
58.21
54.97
63.85
59.75
61.24

4.5
4.2
1.8
2.7
4.4*
4.9
2.9*
5.2*
2.3
1.8
1.1
3.9
1.1
4.2
3.0
4.8

0
7
5
0
52*
0
14*
61*
11*
4*
0
0
0
4*
0
0

62.22
58.03
63.21
56.96
61.78
57.66
62.53
57.09
67.92*
62.74
57.31
56.05
65.09
68.04*
53.97
61.49

4.0
4.0
2.0
3.6
4.1
1.3
2.0
5.1
4.9*
2.9
5.3
3.9
4.5
4.2*
1.8
2.0

5
0
11*
0
0
0
5
0
21*
5*
0
0
7*
45*
0
0

M
SE
Hockey Player
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

63.31
1.49

3.76
0.24

16.31
5.99

62.74
1.38

3.27
0.35

9.88
4.69

60.76
1.05

3.45
0.33

6.19
2.96

58.93
56.74
59.45
66.11*
56.15
64.49
56.88
56.38
57.26
55.95
59.59
55.19
63.58*
67.03*
58.90
55.08

3.2
5.5
1.7
3.3*
3.8
3.8
1.1
2.6
4.9
3.6
3.3
2.5
1.5*
4.5*
4.3
2.8

0
0
0
19*
0
11*
0
0
0
0
0
0
7*
25*
0
0

66.35*
55.24
66.64*
59.58
56.88
69.15*
60.20
56.90
59.26
57.89
52.26
53.07
59.52
77.59*
57.92
56.96

2.3*
3.4
2.0*
2.2
4.8
4.2*
3.6
3.1
4.9
3.1
3.4
4.0
1.8
4.2*
3.3
3.2

9*
0
10*
0
0
32*
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
37*
0
0

62.33
52.71
60.51
69.05*
58.51
64.57*
59.78
56.99
56.56
54.02
63.43*
56.76
58.76
61.57
59.43
57.38

4.2
1.5
1.4
3.1*
3.8
3.7*
4.0
2.5
5.3
2.6
4.2*
4.7
4.5
2.7
2.7
3.1

0
0
0
42*
0
19*
0
0
0
0
9*
0
0
5*
0
0

M
SE

59.23
0.98

3.25
0.31

3.88
1.95

60.34
1.64

3.31
0.24

5.50
2.95

59.52
1.02

3.35
0.28

4.69
2.80
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Piano Imagery
vs. Rest
Time #TP
Participant Acc
Control
1
55.93 1.7
0
2
64.05 3.5
3*
3
62.08 2.9
0
4
58.30 3.4
0
5
54.89 4.3
0
6
62.36 5.3
0
7
58.08 4.9
0
8
60.28 2.7
0
9
66.55* 2.6* 34*
10
62.13 2.5
4*
11
70.64* 1.4* 15*
12
70.32* 3.3* 66*
13
77.58* 4.1* 67*
14
59.02 4.4
0
15
61.86 3.1
4*
16
65.89* 3.9* 14*
M
SE

63.12
1.49

3.35
0.27

Hockey Imagery
vs. Rest
Acc Time #TP
60.40
69.09*
68.41*
61.32
57.70
72.71*
59.03
60.51
62.31
62.86
63.94
64.07*
77.16*
57.31
59.47
63.69

12.94 63.75
5.70 1.38

Hand Squeeze Imagery
vs. Rest
Acc
Time
#TP

4.1
5.1*
2.7*
4.3
4.2
3.4*
2.5
2.7
3.8
3.0
1.4
1.8*
3.3*
1.9
4.4
2.6

0
19*
18*
0
0
52*
0
0
6*
4*
4*
13*
64*
0
0
7*

56.47
65.34
68.33*
59.63
58.43
69.83*
60.55
66.79*
65.03*
65.34*
61.99
57.86
76.53*
58.18
68.56*
60.22

3.18
0.26

11.69 63.69
4.82 1.37

2.1
5.5
2.7*
2.8
2.9
5.5*
2.5
4.7*
3.5*
4.6*
1.3
2.2
3.3*
1.7
4.5*
2.8

0
3*
21*
0
0
30*
0
10*
20*
25*
0
0
67*
0
17*
0

3.25
0.33

12.06
4.53

Notes. Acc=maximum cross-validated classification accuracy (%); Time=time of Acc
(seconds following offset of auditory cue); #TP=number of time points for which
statistically reliable classification results were obtained; M=mean; SE=standard error of
the mean.
*p<.05, with False Discovery Rate correction for multiple comparisons
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Supplementary Table C-3. Single-trial classification outcomes for Experiment 3 of
Chapter 2.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Simple Piano Imagery
vs. Rest
Acc
Time
#TP
74.10*
3.2*
45*
65.47*
3.5*
9*
59.25
3.6
0
61.32
4.3
0
60.46
3.9
0
61.31
4.6
10*
79.41*
2.9*
76*
81.60*
3.6*
69*
67.74
4.1
37*
62.35
4.6
9*
60.84
3.5
0
58.44
1.6
0
76.45*
4.1*
63*
72.14*
3.0*
53*
61.21
3.1
0
59.28
4.5
0

Complex Piano Imagery
vs. Rest
Acc
Time
#TP
72.48*
2. 9*
64*
64.29
3.7
9*
67.50*
2.7*
24*
60.47
3.3
0
71.67*
5.5*
43*
64.55*
4.8*
23*
84.77*
2.8*
74*
82.22*
3.6*
73*
72.78*
4.5*
64*
76.09*
5.2*
40*
56.81
1.8
0
61.37
2.8
6*
72.88*
4.1*
51*
78.50*
3.1*
63*
64.25
3.9
5*
63.05
1.8
0

M
SE

66.34
1.96

69.60
2.03

Participant

3.61
0.19

23.19
7.18

3.51
0.28

33.69
28.41

Notes. Acc=maximum cross-validated classification accuracy (%); Time=time of Acc
(seconds following offset of auditory cue); #TP=number of time points for which
statistically reliable classification results were obtained; M=mean; SE=standard error of
the mean.
*p<.05, with False Discovery Rate correction for multiple comparisons
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Appendix D: Clinical behavioural data for the patients in Chapter 4.
Coma Recovery Scale-Revised scores for each patient immediately prior to the experimental assessments with electroencephalography
and functional magnetic resonance imaging.
ID

CRS-R Sub-scores at EEG assessment
Test Auditory

VS1 1

VS2 1

1-Startle

1-Startle

Visual
0-None

0-None

Motor

Oromotor

2-Flexion
1-Reflexive
withdrawal

1-Abnormal 1-Reflexive
posturing

Comm
0-None

0-None

CRS-R Sub-scores at fMRI assessment
Arousal

Task

Auditory

1-Eye open Attention 1-Startle
w/ stim

1-Startle

VS4 1
2

VS5 1

2-Eye open
w/out stim

Imagery 1-Startle

0-None

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

1-Eye open
w/ stim

1-Eye open Attention 1-Startle
w/ stim

0-None

1-Abnormal
posturing

1-Reflexive

0-None

1-Eye open
w/ stim

1-Startle

0-None

1-Reflexive

0-None

1-Eye open
w/ stim

1-Startle

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

1-Eye open
w/ stim

2-Localization 1-Startle

2-Flexion
1-Reflexive
withdrawal

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim

1-Startle

2-Flexion
1-Reflexive
withdrawal

0-None

2-Eye open Imagery 1-Startle
w/out stim

1-Abnormal 1-Reflexive
posturing

0-None

Arousal

0-None

2-Eye open Both
w/out stim

0-None

Comm

1-Reflexive

0-None

0-None

Oromotor

0-None

2-Flexion
1-Reflexive
withdrawal

1-Startle

0-None

Motor

1-Startle

Imagery 1-Startle

VS3 1

Visual

1-Startle

(fMRI assessments conducted only at EEG Session 2)
1-Startle

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim

Attention 1-Startle

0-None

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

1-Eye open
w/ stim

1-Eye open Attention 1-Startle
w/ stim

0-None

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

1-Eye open
w/ stim

Imagery 1-Startle

0-None

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim
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ID

CRS-R Sub-scores at EEG assessment
Test Auditory

Visual

Motor

Oromotor

Comm

CRS-R Sub-scores at fMRI assessment
Arousal

Task

Auditory

Visual

Motor

Oromotor

Comm

Arousal

VS6 1

1-Startle

0-None

2-Flexion
1-Reflexive
withdrawal

0-None

1-Eye open Both
w/ stim

0-None

1-Startle

0-None

0-None

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim

2

1-Startle

0-None

2-Flexion
1-Reflexive
withdrawal

0-None

2-Eye open Both
w/out stim

0-None

0-None

0-None

0-None

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim

VS7 1

1-Startle

0-None

1-Abnormal 1-Reflexive
posturing

0-None

2-Eye open Imagery 1-Startle
w/out stim

1-Startle

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim

0-None

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim

Attention 1-Startle

MCS1 1

1-Startle

1-Startle

1-Abnormal 1-Reflexive
posturing

0-None

1-Eye open Both
w/ stim

1-Startle

3-Pursuit

1-Abnormal
posturing

1-Reflexive

0-None

1-Eye open
w/ stim

MCS2 1

1-Startle

3-Pursuit

2-Flexion
1-Reflexive
withdrawal

0-None

1-Eye open Both
w/ stim

1-Startle

3-Pursuit

4-Object
1-Reflexive
manipulation

0-None

1-Eye open
w/ stim

MCS3 1

3-Reproducible 3-Pursuit
movement to
command

2-Flexion
1-Reflexive
withdrawal

0-None

2-Eye open Imagery 2-Localization 3-Pursuit
w/out stim

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim

2-Flexion
withdrawal

1-Reflexive

0-None

1-Eye open
w/ stim

3-Reproducible 3-Pursuit
movement to
command

2-Flexion
2-Vocalization 0-None
withdrawal

2-Eye open
w/out stim

1-Startle

1-Abnormal 1-Reflexive
posturing

2-Eye open Imagery 1-Startle
w/out stim

2

MCS4 1

EMCS1 1

4-Consistent
movement to
command

3-Pursuit

Attention 1-Startle

0-None

3-Pursuit

(fMRI assessments conducted once 7.5 months prior to EEG Session 1)
3-Pursuit

1-Abnormal
posturing

1-Reflexive

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim

Attention 2-Localization 3-Pursuit

1-Abnormal
posturing

1-Reflexive

0-None

2-Eye open
w/out stim

6-Functional 2-Vocalization 2-Accurate, 3-Attention Imagery 4-Consistent
5-Object
recognition object use
Functional
movement to
command

Attention 4-Consistent
movement to
command

5-Object
6-Functional 2-Vocalization 2-Accurate,
recognition object use
Functional

3-Attention

4-Object
4-Object
1-Reflexive
localization manipulation

1-Eye open
w/ stim

1-NonFunctional:
Intentional
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ID

CRS-R Sub-scores at EEG assessment
Test Auditory

LIS1 1

Motor

Oromotor

Comm

Arousal

Task

(Not assessed)a

2

EMCS2 1

Visual

CRS-R Sub-scores at fMRI assessment

4-Consistent
movement to
command

4-Consistent
movement to
command

6-Functional 3-Intelligible
5-Object
recognition object use
verbalization

5-Object
0-None
recognition

1-Reflexive

Auditory

Visual

Motor

Oromotor

Comm

Arousal

(fMRI assessments conducted once 1.5 months prior to EEG Session 1)
2-Accurate, 3-Attention Imagery 4-Consistent
Functional
movement to
command

5-Object
5-Automatic
recognition response

0-None

2-Accurate,
Functional

3-Attention

Attention 4-Consistent
movement to
command

5-Object
5-Automatic
recognition response

3-Intelligible
verbalization

2-Accurate,
Functional

3-Attention

5-Object
0-None
recognition

1-Reflexive

2-Accurate,
Functional

3-Attention

2-Accurate, 3-Attention Both
Functional

4-Consistent
movement to
command

Notes. CRS-R=Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005); EEG=electroencephalography; fMRI=functional magnetic
resonance imaging; Comm=communication; w/=with; stim=stimulation; VS=Vegetative State; MCS=Minimally Conscious State;
EMCS=emergent from a Minimally Conscious State; LIS=Locked-in Syndrome.
a

Patient EMCS1 was not assessed with the CRS-R at her replication session. However, she could communicate using an arm
movement.
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